Three Essays on the Italian Labour Market: The Measurement of Unemployment, The Determinants of Registration at the Public Employment Agencies, and The Gap between Subjective and Objective Position of Immigrants by KSEBI, ILHAM
Three Essays on the Italian Labour Market:
The Measurement of Unemployment
The Determinants of Registration at the Public
Employment Agencies
and The Gap between Subjective and Objective
Position of Immigrants
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ECONOMICS
Ilham Ksebi
Department of Economics (DIEC)
University of Genoa
Supervisor: Marco Guerrazzi
May 5, 2020
Contents
List of Figures 3
List of Tables 4
0.1 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
0.2 Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1 Measuring Unemployment by means of Official Data and Administrative
Records: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives 8
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Official data versus administrative records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 Time series analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2 Official and registered job seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.3 Employment and official/registered job seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.4 Official job seekers and inflows in registered unemployment . . . . . 17
1.3.5 Age and gender distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.6 Reconciling data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 A theoretical model with unconstructive searchers and claimants in em-
ployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4.1 Search for workers, jobs and upgrades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.2 Supply of vacancies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.3 Wage determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.4 Unconstructive searchers and claimants in employment . . . . . . . 25
1.4.5 Productivity shocks and policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 Official and registered unemployment: Why do we need both? . . . . . . . 30
1.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Bibliography 34
2 The Registration in Italian Public Employment Agencies: Motivations
and Determinants 38
2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1
2.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4.1 Public employment agencies’ users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5 The probability of registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.1 Empirical design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.2 Results and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Bibliography 55
3 Are they Over Satisfied? The Gap between Subjective and Objective
Position of Immigrants in the Italian Labour Market 58
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 The Italian case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 Variables and analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6.1 Objective work index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6.2 Subjective work index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.6.3 The subjective gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.6.4 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.7 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Bibliography 84
Appendices 88
A The Italian official classification of occupations 89
B Variables and definitions 92
2
List of Figures
1.1 Official and registered job seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Impulse response functions for official and registered job seekers . . . . . . 13
1.3 The multiplier of registered unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Official versus registered job seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 Employment versus official and registered job seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.6 Official job seekers versus inflows in registered unemployment . . . . . . . 17
1.7 Age and gender distribution of official unemployment and registered job
seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.8 Reconciled series and the trend of official job seekers . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1 PEA effectiveness by region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2 Registered unemployment by ILO/LFS labour status . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3 Patterns of PEAs use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1 Population change by component (annual rates), EU-28 1960-2018,Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo gind) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Objective work index distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3 Subjective work index distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4 Subjective and objective variables by migration status (proportions) . . . . 65
3.5 The subjective gap distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3
List of Tables
1.1 Estimated weights for reconciling registered unemployment . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1 Characteristics of jobs matched by PEAs versus other jobs . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 Registered unemployment versus unregistered unemployment . . . . . . . . 47
2.3 The marginal effects of the registration probability in PEAs . . . . . . . . 51
3.1 Description of the sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Means and standard deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Objective work index regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4 Subjective work index regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5 The subjective gap regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.6 Robustness check-The subjective gap regressions (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.7 Robustness check-The subjective gap regressions (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.8 Robustness check-The subjective gap ordered probability regressions . . . . 77
3.9 Robustness check-The subjective mismatch probability regressions . . . . . 78
3.10 Robustness check-Income satisfaction gap regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.11 Robustness check-Job satisfaction gap regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4
0.1 Acknowledgments
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Marco Guerrazzi for his
suggestions, insight, guidance, and constant support from the beginning and throughout the
process of completing this Thesis. I am truly indebted to Prof. Camille Hemet for hosting
me multiple times at the Paris School of Economics, for her comments on the primary
stages of the empirical design of my thesis second chapter (The Registration in Italian
Public Employment Agencies: Motivations and Determinants), and for providing me with
the opportunity to benefit from a public grant overseen by the French National Research
Agency (ANR-18-CE22-0013-01) for the third chapter. I would especially like to thank
Prof. Andrew Clark, for supervising the empirical design of the last chapter (The Gap
between Subjective and Objective Position of Immigrants in the Italian Labour Market),
and his useful guidelines on using the statistical program. I would like to thank Prof. Anna
Bottasso, the director of the Economic PhD program at the University of Genoa, for her
constant and useful advices and guidelines for our path as PhD candidates. I would like
to thank Prof. Ugo Trivellato for his comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of
the first chapter. Part of my Thesis was written while I was visiting researcher at the
Institut National D’études Démographiques-(INED), which I gratefully acknowledge their
hospitality. My sincere appreciation goes to Dr. Cris Beauchemin, research director at
(INED), for his kindness in giving me the opportunity to visit the institute. I would like
to thank Prof. Gianluca Orefice for his encouragement to carry out the third chapter and
for his comments on its early stages. A very special ”Thank you” to all my friends at
the Paris School of Economics and at the Institut National D’études Démographiques, to
my colleagues in the PhD program at the University of Genoa, and to all members of the
Department of Economics. Last but not least, I would very much like to thank my family
and my friends for their love and exceptional support. In particular, I thank my mother
for supporting me spiritually throughout writing this thesis and in all my life .
5
0.2 Foreword
Despite some signs of economic recovery in the Eurozone, the Italian economy continues to
struggle. The high unemployment rates accompanying the recent waves of immigration to
Italy warns that the Italian economic situation should be taken seriously. Therefore, the
presence of accurate indicators of the labour market performance has become an urgent
necessity to enable policymakers to take appropriate procedures.
This dissertation deals with two distinct issues in the Italian labour market. One the
one hand, it investigates the phenomenon of the existence of two diverse data sources on
unemployment that continuously declares uneven unemployment rates. Those sources for
unemployment indicators are the official statistics that conduct by the National Bureau
of Statistics (ISTAT), and the administrative records that collect by public employment
agencies (Centri per l’Impiego - CPIs). Indeed, various evidence was found on the hetero-
geneity between the two measures of unemployment (cf. Barbieri et al. 2000; Anastasia
and Disar‘o, 2005; Guerrazzi, 2012). One the other hand, since immigrant workers, report
relatively higher levels of perceived income and job satisfaction than local workers, even
if their situation in the labour market, tends to be worse than that of natives (Amit and
Chachashvili-Bolotin, 2018). This dissertation provides an investigation of the mentioned
phenomenon in the Italian context.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I will present a study by the title Measur-
ing unemployment by means of Official Data and Administrative Records: Empirical and
Theoretical Perspectives, that is co-authored by Marco Guerrazzi, and forthcoming in
Quaderni di Economia del Lavoro (ISSN: 0390-105X). The mentioned chapter addresses
the measurement of unemployment in the Italian regional context. In particular, it re-
trieves macro data on the Tuscany region to compare the picture of unemployment that
emerges by exploring the official statistics and administrative records over the period after
the burst of the Great Recession. Besides, it provides a way to reconcile the two measures
of unemployment and develop a model that offers a rationale for the coexistence of official
and registered job seekers. The empirical results confirm that registered unemployment
is higher, more persistent and more concentrated on women than official unemployment.
Whereas, the theoretical part allows clarifying some features of observed results, such as
increasing the diversity between unemployment indicators during the years of the reces-
sion.
The second chapter is by the title The Registration in Italian Public Employment
Agencies: Motivations and Determinants examines further the issue of measuring unem-
ployment by using self-reported questions in the Italian Labour Force Survey. Accordingly,
it matches individuals that declared to have an active registration in employment agencies
to their current working status according to the official statistics. Results suggest that
only half of the registrants belong to individuals considered unemployed in the official
standards. Moreover, this chapter presents some reasons that lie behind the variety be-
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tween official and registered unemployment, in particular, the determinants of the decision
to register in public employment agencies. It concludes that eligibility for unemployment
benefits and participation in vocational training programs substantially affect unemploy-
ments decision to register. I wrote part of this paper while I was invited to the Paris
School of Economics by Camille Hemet, and it benefited by her useful comments on the
primary stages of the empirical design.
Finally, the third chapter is titled The Gap between Subjective and Objective Position
of Immigrants in the Italian Labour Market uses the Italian Labour force Survey to esti-
mates the gap between subjective work perceptions and objective work status, breaking
it down by various dimensions. Results indicate that female immigrants and immigrants
from developing countries report higher income and job satisfaction than natives when
considering the actual job position. I conducted this paper during my visiting at the Paris
School of Economics, and it benefited from the guidance of Andrew Clark.
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Chapter 1
Measuring Unemployment by means
of Official Data and Administrative
Records: Empirical and Theoretical
Perspectives
1.1 Overview
This paper addresses the measurement of unemployment in the Italian regional context.
Specifically, retrieving data from Tuscany, we compare the picture of unemployment that
emerges by exploring official data and administrative records over the period after the
burst of the Great Recession. Consistently with previous findings, we find that registered
unemployment is higher, more persistent and more concentrated on women than its official
measure. Nevertheless, we show that the cyclical behaviour of registered job seekers is
similar to the one of official job seekers. Moreover, we provide a way to reconcile the two
measures of unemployment. Thereafter, we develop a model that provides a rationale
for the coexistence of official and registered job seekers and we explore how it reacts to
productivity shocks and its policy implications. Finally, we offer some insights about the
desirability of an integrated use of these data.1
1This chapter is coauthored by Marco Guerrazzi.
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1.2 Introduction
From an empirical point of view, in Italy - like in many others developed countries -
there are two alternative ways to measure unemployment. On the one hand, the official
perspective recommends to retrieve data from the National Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT).
Following guidelines defined at the international level by the International Labour Orga-
nization (ILO), ISTAT measures unemployment by asking every week to a representative
sample of Italian families about their employment status and their labour market atti-
tudes. Specifically, official unemployed people are those that at the time of the interview
state: a) to be jobless; b) to have done concrete job search activities during the last four
weeks; and c) to be willing to accept a job within two weeks (cf. Battistin et al. 2006).
Making inference out of the sample of people that fulfill those requirements, ISTAT pro-
vides the ‘official’ number of job seekers and the harmonized rate of unemployment, i.e.,
the ratio between people actively looking for a job and the corresponding labour force, at
the national, regional and provincial level.
On the other hand, Italian regional administrations handle public employment agencies
(Centri per l’Impiego - CPIs) headquartered in each province where jobless individuals can
decide - if they want to do it - to register their prompt willingness to work. Consequently,
each CPI collects ‘administrative’ records on jobless people - sometimes called counting
customers - that are looking for jobs all around its area of competence no matter their
eligibility to claim unemployment benefits. Indeed, in Italy the number of registered
unemployed does not coincide and is much wider than the claimant count, i.e., the number
of people entitled to receive the job seeker allowance.
At least in principle, the two mentioned statistical sources should catch about the
same phenomenon. However, the available empirical evidence reveals that the measure of
unemployment provided by ISTAT is quite different from the one retrieved by provincial
employment agencies. Specifically, unemployment recorded by CPIs is usually larger than
the corresponding official figure (cf. Anastasia and Disarò, 2005; Guerrazzi, 2012). More-
over, the distance observed between the two measures of unemployment goes well beyond
the sampling errors inexorably attached to harmonized unemployment (cf. Barbieri et al.
2000).2
The factors usually called in to explain the observed discrepancies between official and
registered unemployment in Italy are twofold. First, inaccuracies in the updating process
of provincial records of job seekers tend to inflate registered unemployment. For instance,
2Even if the observed distances are often smaller, the higher incidence of registered unemployment with
respect to official - or harmonized - unemployment is a recurring feature that characterizes a number of
developed countries such as Germany, Austria, France, Ireland, Finland and the Netherlands (cf. Melis
and Lüdeke, 2006; Konle-Seidl and Lüdeke, 2017). By contrast, given the low willingness to register
prevailing in rural areas, in China registered unemployment falls short what is perceived as the actual
level of unemployment (cf. Knight and Xue, 2006; Wang and Sun, 2014).
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it may happen that a worker who starts her own business remains for a while in the
provincial registers or it is also possible to find the same person in the archives of two or
more CPIs. In addition, provincial records have the tendency to include people that for
official statistics are employed or out of the labour force; indeed, workers with minimal
jobs as well as people whose job search intensity is unconstructive - or unfulfilling - are
not cancelled and often retain their position in the provincial files. The former group
collects the so-called claimants in employment, the latter the economically inactive -
or unconstructive - searchers. Concretely, claimants in employment are registered job
seekers who have worked more than one hour in temporary or subsidized jobs during the
week before the interview and therefore are classified as employed according to official
criteria. Moreover, unconstructive searchers are registered job seekers whose registration
is older than one month and since then they didn’t perform any other concrete search
activity.3 When they are not eligible to claim unemployment benefits, it is very likely
that these individuals have decided to register in order to claim the set of perquisites that
local governments usually recognize to registered job seekers for the mere fact of finding
themselves in the provincial files. For example, registered job seekers are exempt from
medical bills and they are entitled to receive other benefits for accessing to public utilities
such as local transportation and child care. As we will show below, the presence of those
two groups of individuals as well as the optionality of registration are able to affect the
cyclical properties of registered unemployment.
Considering the distortions recalled above and stressing its administrative dependence,
some authors questioned the usefulness of resorting to registered unemployment for the
economic analysis of labour market trends (e.g. Fenwick and Denman, 1996). Nonetheless,
some scholars argue in favour of an integration among official and administrative statistics
on unemployment. For instance, trying to asses ‘true’ unemployment in Austria, Biffil
(1997) maintains that official statistics may well underestimate the labour resources which
may be activated by an improvement of economic conditions and the extent of poverty
and social discontent. Moreover, exploring UK data where - like in the US and Australia
- registered unemployment and the claimant count coincide, Thomas (1998) argues that
a reconciliation of official and registered unemployment is necessary to understand the
actual dynamics of the labour market. In addition, addressing the evidence of Baltic
countries and Montenegro, Hazans (2008) claims that these two statistical sources are
both necessary for a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the employment situation
in a given region.
Following the latter research line, in this paper we retrieve data from Tuscany and we
compare the pictures of unemployment that emerges by using official data and admin-
istrative records over the decade 2008-2017, i.e., the years after the burst of the Great
3Among unconstructive searchers we may find individuals in rest unemployment, i.e., workers that
have been fired in a given industry that are available to return to work in that industry, and that industry
only (cf. Alvarez and Shimer, 2011).
10
Recession. Consistently with the discrepancies recalled above, we find that registered un-
employment is definitely higher, more persistent and more concentrated on women with
respect to its official measure. However, despite these heterogeneities, we show that the
stock of registered job seekers conveys a cyclical information about the labour market per-
formance that goes in the same direction of the one indicated by official unemployment
no matter the non-compulsory character of registration and the simultaneous presence
of claimants in employment and unconstructive searchers. Moreover, exploring the cor-
responding age and gender distributions, we provide a straightforward way to reconcile
registered unemployment to ILO unemployment.
Thereafter, we develop a search model in which individuals that fulfill the criteria
of official unemployment may coexist with claimants in employment and unconstructive
searchers and we explore how that theoretical framework reacts to productivity shocks
and we assess its policy implications. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
contribution that tries to address official and registered unemployment from an empirical
and a theoretical perspective. In addition, aiming at improving the existing statistics on
employment hardship, we offer some critical insights about the desirability of an integrated
use of these data.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 reports evidence on official and registered
unemployment by focusing on their cyclical properties and making an effort to reconcile
the two series. Section 3 develops a search model with unconstructive searchers and
claimants in employment. Section 4 offers some insight on how to amend and integrate
official and administrative data on unemployment. Finally, section 5 concludes.
1.3 Official data versus administrative records
In this section we present some data on unemployment in Tuscany. Being placed in the
central part of the country, Tuscany can be taken as a representative area between the
relatively low-unemployment Italian regions of the North and high-unemployment regions
of the South. Moreover, according to Barbieri et al. (2000), Tuscany is among the regions
in which more than 80% of the individuals surveyed for the calculation of official job
seekers are actually registered in the archives of the competent CPIs. That percentage of
overlapping between official and registered job seekers places Tuscany among the Italian
regions in which the updating problems and inconsistencies of provincial files mentioned
in the introduction appear less severe.
The observation period covers with quarterly figures the years immediately after the
burst of the Great Recession. Specifically, consistently with actual data availability, our
observation window is opened in the last quarter of 2008 and is closed in the final quarter
of 2017. Within this time span, Tuscany hosted - on average - about 6.7% of the national
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active population.4
Available data on employment hardship have some limitations that are worth mak-
ing clear from the beginning. First, official figures on Italian regional unemployment do
not allow to distinguish between long-term and short-term unemployment and are silent
about the educational achievements on the involved individuals. Moreover, although the-
oretically possible, disclosed data on registered unemployment do not provide information
to detect claimants in employment and unconstructive searchers. Consequently, aware of
its variegated composition, we will treat registered unemployment as a unique series like
the one of official unemployment.
1.3.1 Time series analysis
The time path of official (on the left) and registered (on the right) job seekers is illustrated
in the two panels of figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1: Official and registered job seekers
The two diagrams show some regularities that can be summarized as follows. First, all
over the concerned period, both series mirror a sharp worsening of labour market prospects
for Tuscan workers. Indeed, with the exception of the final part of the observation period,
the number of official job seekers as well as the registered one display a definite tendency
to rise over time. In this regard, it is worth noting that from 2008 to 2014 the number
of official and registered job seekers doubled their respective magnitudes. Second, the
number of job seekers registered by Tuscan CPIs is much higher than the number of ILO
job seekers estimated by ISTAT. Specifically, the number of registered job seekers is, on
average, 3.64 times the figure of official job seekers.5 Third, while the official measure of
4Official (administrative) data can be retrieved by logging at the web page http://dati.istat.it
(http://www.regione.toscana.it/osservatorio-regionale-mercato-del-lavoro/consultazione-dati-sil).
5Taking the official figures of the labour force in Tuscany, the harmonized unemployment rate has
been, on average, 7.88% over the period of analysis whereas the ratio between the stock of registered job
seekers and the active population reached 28.51%. In calibrated models, high levels of the unemployment
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unemployment displays fluctuations around an increasing trend, the registered reference
shows a steady rise with the exception of few quarters only. Obviously, these patterns
suggest that registered unemployment is more persistent than official unemployment. In
details, taking logs of the two series, the AR(1) coefficient is 0.822 for the official job seekers
and 0.986 for the registered ones. Furthermore, the gender gap, i.e., the proportion of
female among unemployed people, is higher and more stable for registered job seekers
than for official job seekers. Concretely, the percentage of female is, on average, equal to
53.16% within official unemployment and 58.90% for registered unemployment.6
The different degree of persistence displayed by the two series raises the issue of how
the stocks of official and registered job seekers may react to exogenous shocks (cf. Gil-
Alana and Jiang, 2013). In that direction, the two diagrams in figure 1.2 plot the impulse
response functions to a normalized one-unit shock in the standard deviation of each series
taken in logs (details on the required VAR estimations are available from the authors
upon request).
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Figure 1.2: Impulse response functions for official and registered job seekers
Even if the two series display the properties of a mean-reversion process, the two panels
of figure 1.2 highlight some important differences. Specifically, the diagram on the LHS
shows that immediately after the shock official job seekers tend to come back to their
equilibrium level by means of dumped oscillations. However, after twenty quarters the se-
ries is still 0.10 percentage points above its steady-state. By contrast, the diagram on the
RHS shows that registered job seekers overshoot for four quarters the initial value of the
shock, then the series starts to converge slowly and monotonically to its equilibrium level.
Indeed, after twenty quarters registered job seekers are 0.28 percentage points above their
rate such as the one conveyed by registered job seekers are usually rationalized through the accounting
of unconstructive searchers (e.g. Zanetti, 2007)
6Among registered job seekers we observe a quite continuous decrease in the percentage of female
individuals. By contrast, among official job seekers the percentage of women is almost constant over
time.
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steady-state level. This finding corroborates the lower persistence of official unemploy-
ment conveyed by the different AR(1) coefficients and suggest some insights about the
theory that should be used to frame the two measures of unemployment. Indeed, leaving
the behaviour of prices and wages to future investigations, ILO unemployment appears
more consistent with the natural rate hypothesis according to which unemployment has
an inherent tendency to revert towards some special reference (cf. Friedman, 1968). By
contrast, registered unemployment seems to replicate the typical features stressed by the
hysteresis approach. According to that latter view, shocks that hit the labour market
tend to have long-lasting effects so that unemployment can differ from its ‘natural’ rate
for a long time (cf. Blanchard and Summers, 1986).
Looking at the evolution of official and registered job seekers over time, an additional
interesting feature of the data illustrated in figure 1.1 is that ratio between the latter and
the former series displays a fluctuating path without any prominent trend which is mainly
ascribable to the cyclical component of official unemployment. Specifically, as shown in
figure 1.3, that multiplier - with few exceptions - has been quite stable all over the period.
Indeed, it varied from a minimum values of 3.03 achieved in the first quarter of 2010 to a
maximum of 4.54 tipped in the third quarter of 2011.
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Figure 1.3: The multiplier of registered unemployment
In the next section, we will show that the magnitude of the multiplier illustrated in
figure 1.3 may depend on the path of labour productivity as well as on the institutional
framework that rules the functioning of the labour market.
1.3.2 Official and registered job seekers
While the higher incidence of females among unemployed individuals is a structural feature
of Italian unemployment (cf. Bertola and Garibaldi, 2003), the other peculiarities of the
two series illustrated in figure 1.1 deserve a deeper analysis. For this purpose, the two
14
diagrams of figure 1.4 plot the results of a linear regression between the number of official
and registered job seekers (on the left) and the corresponding logarithmic trend deviations
(on the right).7
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Figure 1.4: Official versus registered job seekers
The left-hand-side panel of figure 1.4 shows that there is a statistically significant
positive relation between the number of official and registered job seekers. Indeed, the
slope of the regression line between the two series - including the presence of a constant -
is 2.72 with a standard error of 0.242 whereas the corresponding value of the R2 is equal
to 78.22%.8
The strength of such a relation may rise the reasonable suspicion that those results may
be the upshot of a spurious regression. Admittedly, the Great Recession can be considered
as the confounding factor that pushed upward ILO and registered unemployment in a joint
manner. However, the regression results in the RHS of figure 1.4 reveal the existence of
a deeper relation between official and registered job seekers. Specifically, removing the
upward trend from the two series, the positive link between the number of official and
registered job seekers still survives although with a lower coefficient of determination.
Indeed, the slope of the regression line between the two series becomes 0.189 with a
standard error of 0.063 and a R2 of 20.15%.
The interpretation for this result is twofold. On the one hand, registered unemploy-
ment conveys a cyclical information about the performance of the labour market that
goes in the same direction on the one indicated by official unemployment. In other words,
when ILO unemployment is above or below its trend the same holds for registered unem-
ployment. On the other hand, the presence of unconstructive searchers among registered
job seekers and the optionality of registration are likely to move official and registered
unemployment in opposite directions by providing a rationale for the lower significance of
7Here and in the remainder of the paper, trends are taken with the HP filter by setting the smoothing
parameter at the conventional quarterly reference of 1, 600.
8Qualitatively similar figures are found by Kyriacou et al. (2009) and Litra (2017), respectively in
Cyprus and Romania where, however, registered unemployment falls short of official unemployment.
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the positive relation between the logarithmic trend deviations plotted in the second panel
of figure 1.4. For instance, when official job seekers registered to CPIs quit their search ac-
tivities they may well remain and enlarge provincial archives but lose their position in the
sample of officially unemployed persons. By contrast, it is also possible that lost-standing
unconstructive searchers who have lost the benefits of registration begin some different
searching activities that allow them to be surveyed as official job seekers. Furthermore,
upward movements in ILO job seekers can happen without any movement in registered
unemployment as the additional job seekers may decide to avoid registration.
1.3.3 Employment and official/registered job seekers
A confirmation of the cyclical signal conveyed by registered unemployment can be ob-
tained by exploring how employment variations are affected by movements in official and
registered job seekers (cf. Thomas, 1998). In this direction, the two panels of figure 1.5
plot the results of two distinct linear regressions: the former between the logarithmic
trend deviations of employment and official job seekers (on the left), the latter between
the logarithmic trend deviations of employment and registered job seekers (on the right).
In both cases, the measure of employment is given by the harmonized one.
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Figure 1.5: Employment versus official and registered job seekers
The two panels of figure 1.5 reveal that official and registered unemployment are both
negatively correlated to employment. Specifically, the logarithmic trend deviations of
official unemployment move in the opposite direction of the corresponding measure of
employment in a significant manner whereas the coefficient that links the logarithmic
trend deviations of registered unemployment to employment trend deviation is negative
but not statistically significant. The missing significance of the anti-cyclical pattern of
registered job seekers can be ascribed to the presence of claimants in employment within
the former group as well as to the already mentioned optionality of registration. For
instance, upward movements of registered job seekers can go together with a similar
movement in ILO employment when those registered individuals obtain minimal jobs
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that allow to retain their positions in the provincial archives. Moreover, drops in official
employment can happen without any enlargement of registered job seekers when the
people who lose their job decide to postpone or avoid registration.
1.3.4 Official job seekers and inflows in registered unemploy-
ment
As we stated in the introduction, an issue with Italian registered unemployment is the
updating of provincial archives of job seekers (cf. Oliveri, 2009). Consequently, some
interesting information may be obtained by analyzing the relation between official un-
employment and the inflows in registered unemployment that - by definition - are not
affected by updating problems.9 For this purpose, the two diagrams of figure 1.6 plot the
results of a linear regression between the number of official job seekers and the inflows of
new job seekers in the provincial archives (on the left) and the corresponding logarithmic
trend deviations (on the right).
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Figure 1.6: Official job seekers versus inflows in registered unemployment
The diagrams in figure 1.6 show that relation between official job seekers and the flow
of new registrations is negligible. Indeed, in both cases, i.e., in the estimation in levels as
well as in the one run on logarithmic trend deviations, the hypothesis of no correlation
cannot be rejected. In other words, the inflows on registered unemployment are about
the same no matter the level of ILO unemployment. This result, together with the ones
in figures 1.4 and 5, reveals that the stock of registered job seekers retains a cyclical
information that is missing from the inflows in registered unemployment.
9Inflows into official unemployment are not available at the regional level so that it is not possible to
make a comparison between the inflows into the two categories of unemployment.
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1.3.5 Age and gender distributions
The different composition of official and registered job seekers becomes apparent when
we consider age and gender distributions (cf. Konle-Seidl and Lüdeke, 2017). Unfortu-
nately, existing data on that matter are not homogeneous in the sense that for official
and registered job seekers are gathered in different age groups.10 In order to overcome
this problem, we assume a uniform distribution of individuals across each age group and
we rearrange the categories of official job seekers consistently with the registered ones. In
the four panels of figure 1.7, we plot the corresponding histograms for official (on the left)
and registered job seekers (on the right) by having regard for the initial (above) and the
final (below) calendar year of our empirical analysis.
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Figure 1.7: Age and gender distribution of official unemployment and registered job seek-
ers
The information conveyed by the four diagrams in figure 1.7 show that the two mea-
sures of unemployment display some common traits as well as some heterogeneities. First,
starting from middle-aged individuals, the concentration of unemployment tends to in-
crease no matter the series taken into account. However, the relative frequency of regis-
tered job seekers has a firm bias in the last age group. Second, the monotonicity of the
path of official unemployment is broken by youth individuals, whose incidence is much
10Official job seekers are gathered by ISTAT in the following age groups: 15 − 24, 25 − 34, 35 − 44,
45− 54 and 55 and more.
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higher with respect to registered unemployment. Third, considering the initial and the
final years of observation, we see that both measures of unemployment become more con-
centrated on females and on individuals aged 40 years or more. Moreover, once again in
both series, we observe severe drops among female individuals aged 31−39 years probably
driven by a discouraging effect triggered by the crisis (cf. Addabbo et al., 2011).
The higher incidence of older individuals among registered job seekers corroborates
the fact that within this group there are people whose search activity is carried out at
low levels. Indeed, in the literature there exists some evidence according to which search
intensity is negatively correlated with the age of the involved individuals (cf. Zacher,
2013; Cohen et al., 2011).
1.3.6 Reconciling data
Age and gender distributions can be used to make an attempt to reconciling official and
registered unemployment (cf. Kyriacou et al., 2009). Specifically, distinguishing between
male and female individuals, the figures of the age distributions of registered job seekers
can be exploited to find out a set of weights that brings back registered unemployment
to ILO unemployment for each gender and for each age group. This task can be done by
estimating a series of constrained least-square models such as
min
ηi,g
2017.4∑
t=2008.4
(UH,t − ηi,gUR,i,t)2 i = {15− 24, 25− 30, 31− 39, 40+} g = {males, females}
s.to
0 < ηi,g < 1
where UR,t (UH,t) are registered (official) job seekers at time t, whereas i is an index for
the age groups indicated in figure 1.7.
The problem above reveals that for each gender and for each age group we are looking
for a coefficient ηi,g constrained between 0 and 1 that minimizes the quadratic distance
between official unemployed and a corresponding weighted measure of registered unem-
ployment. It is well known that the solution of constrained-least-squares problems is
usually very sensitive to the choice of upper and lower bounds for those coefficients (cf.
Ping, 2015). However, taking different bounds for ηi,g such as the relative frequencies of of-
ficial unemployment over the measure of the registered one leads only to minor differences
in the results.11
The estimated values of ηi,g are shown in table 1.1 (standard errors in parenthesis).
11Estimations are run with MAT LAB. Details are available from the authors upon request.
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Age group Males Females
15− 24 0.5431∗∗∗(0.0126) 0.5100∗∗∗(0.0146)
25− 30 0.2814∗∗∗(0.0043) 0.2631∗∗∗(0.0059)
31− 39 0.3462∗∗∗(0.0070) 0.2928∗∗∗(0.0054 )
40+ 0.2579∗∗∗(0.0035) 0.1861∗∗∗( 0.0032)
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Table 1.1: Estimated weights for reconciling registered unemployment
The coefficients collected in table 1.1 are very significant. Their importance rely on the
fact that - everything else being equal - 1−ηi,g may provide an estimation of the incidence
of claimants in employment and unconstructive job seekers in the series of registered job
seekers. In details, considering the different age groups and the gender partition, the
estimated values of ηi,g display remarkable divergencies. First, especially for females, the
weight of claimants in employment and unconstructive job seekers appears particularly
high for individuals aged 40 years or more. Usually, older women are more likely to be in
very non-standard employment relationships than males and this can boost the presence
of claimants in employment among these individuals. Generally speaking, the incidence
of workers with minimal jobs is very sustained among older workers since they are more
likely to possess outdated skills or limited information with respect to younger individuals.
Sometimes older workers obtain atypical work arrangements, such as working less than
10 hours a week, as a form of pre-retirement and this allows those workers to remain
registered in the CPIs records (cf. Riso, 2010).
By contrast, the incidence of claimants in employment and unconstructive job seekers
among young individuals is definitely lower. A rationale for that pattern can be found
in the eligibility criteria of unemployment benefits that usually rule out people without
former work experiences (cf. Crepaldi and Lodovici, 2014). Therefore, younger workers
may be lead to declare themselves as unemployed fulfilling the criteria of official statistics,
but - at the same time - they may have little incentives to register in the provincial files
since they cannot claim unemployment benefits. Furthermore, even if the presence of
unconstructive searchers should be negligible among the younger, the retrieved values of
ηi,g may be the signal of a significant share of claimants in employment. Indeed, there is
evidence that after the years of crisis atypical employment rose among young individuals,
especially for women. In details, employment for people among 15 and 24 years old
displayed a tendency to be concentrated in part-time work and the shadow economy (cf.
Allmendinger et al. 2013; Riedmann and Fischer, 2014).
In addition, low values of ηi,g are found even for middle age groups, i.e., for individuals
aged 25− 30 and 31− 39 years. Actually, people in those age groups tend to be involved
in casual and seasonal work in the sectors of construction, tourism and education. In this
regards, Law 160/1988 extended unemployment insurance to cover this type of workers by
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introducing ad hoc unemployment benefits with reduced requirements. Seasonal workers
who are registered as unemployed enjoy regular support year after year and usually they
do not search for alternatives. Being classified as unemployed workers not seeking a job,
those workers are exempted from activation measures (cf. Galarneau, 2005).
The results in table 1.1 can be used to plot the reconciled series vis-à-vis official
unemployment for both genders.
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Figure 1.8: Reconciled series and the trend of official job seekers
The two panels of figure 1.8 track the series of official job seekers, its trend and the
reconciled series obtained from the procedure described above. Interestingly, the two
reconciled series follow a path similar to the corresponding long-run trends of official
unemployment. Consequently, given the figures of registered unemployment, the weights
in table 1.1 can be used to forecast the expected value of official unemployment. However,
there remains some small systematic differences which may be due - at least in part -
to structural and procedural changes regarding the provision of unemployment benefits.
Specifically, in the third quarter of 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015, the reconciled series
is comparatively higher than the official series. With the exception of 2009 for males and
2012 for females, this seems to be due to the presence of seasonal employment in the
sectors of tourism and catering. As we said above, irrespective of whether or not they
are seeking work during the winter months when they are temporarily out of their jobs,
those individuals may decide to register in order to claim the job seekers allowance.
1.4 A theoretical model with unconstructive searchers
and claimants in employment
Following the lines traced out by Coe and Snower (1997), in this section we develop a
static search model in which official and registered unemployment may coexist in equilib-
rium. For this purpose, we assume that the economy is populated by L > 0 risk-neutral
individuals that inelastically supply their labour services. Among these not-employed
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individuals, a fraction θ, with 0 < θ < 1, searches constructively for a job while the
remaining 1− θ are labeled as unconstructive searchers. The unconstructive searchers are
not willing to work and if they are hired they produce no output. In other words, un-
constructive searchers are merely pretending to search in order to qualify for registration
and - in this way - gain the unemployment benefit or the perquisites and entitlements
recognized to registered job seekers. For sake of simplicity, the value of these benefits is
unified in the parameter b > 0.12
In addition, let us denote N as the level of employment prevailing in the economy.
Among these workers, a fraction ξ, with 0 < ξ < 1, is assumed to be given by claimants in
employment, i.e., workers with minimal jobs who retain the right to maintain their position
in the administrative archives of job seekers. As it will become clear in a moment, these
individuals are engaged in an on-the-job search process aimed at getting an upgrade from
a minimal job to a full position which is assumed to provide a higher wage (cf. Krause
and Lubik, 2006). For that reason, we will make the hypothesis that there are two types
of firms in the economy, i.e., one that posts vacancies for minimal jobs (Vm) and one
that posts vacancies for full positions (Vf ). Consequently, the total number of vacancies
available in the economy will be given by VT = Vm + Vf .
1.4.1 Search for workers, jobs and upgrades
In the model economy, the rate at which workers arrive at a vacancy, the one at which
vacancies arrive at a workers and the one at which job upgrades arrive at a claimant in
employment are conveyed by Poisson processes. In details, the probability that a vacant
full job is matched by a constructive searcher (εf ) and the probability that a vacant
minimal job is matched by a claimant in employment (εm) are assumed to be decreasing
functions of the respective measure of the labour market tightness. Specifically,
εf = εf
(
θL
Vf
)
0 6 εf (·) 6 1 (1.1)
εm = εm
(
ξN
Vm
)
0 6 εm (·) 6 1 (1.2)
where ε′i (·) > 0 for 0 < εi (·) < 1, with i = {f,m}.
Similarly, the probability that a constructively searching worker finds a job (ρf ) and
the probability that a claimant in employment upgrades (ρm) its position are given by
ρf = ρf
(
Vf
θL
)
0 6 ρf (·) 6 1 (1.3)
12In Italy, unemployment benefits are usually granted to jobless individuals with at least a continued
working seniority of one year or more. However, since we deal with a static model, we take b as the
common value of the resources given to unemployed people.
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ρm = ρm
(
Vf
ξN
)
0 6 ρm (·) 6 1 (1.4)
where ρ′i (·) > 0 for 0 < ρi (·) < 1, with i = {f,m}.
Workers with full positions are given by constructive searchers who have found a job.
Consequently, the expression in (1.3) conveys the following relation between N and L:
(1− ξ)N = Lρf
(
Vf
θL
)
θ (1.5)
Obviously, eq. (1.5) implies that the official unemployment rate can be written as
uH = 1− ρf
(
Vf
θL
)
θ (1.6)
By contrast, assuming that all the official job seekers register themselves in the provin-
cial archives and omitting sampling problems, the level of registered job seekers is given by
the sum among official job seekers (L (1− ρf (·) θ)), unconstructive searchers ((1− θ)L)
and claimants in employment (ξN).13 Consequently, taking into account the expression
in (1.5), the registered unemployment rate is given by
uR = 2− θ
(
1−
(
ξ
1− ξ
− 1
)
ρf
(
Vf
θL
))
(1.7)
The expressions in (1.6) and (1.7) reveal that whenever 1− (ξ/ (1− ξ)) ρf (·) is lower
than 1/θ - a condition that is always fulfilled - the rate of registered unemployment is
strictly higher than the official one. Intuitively, the registered unemployment rate is higher
than the official one as long as there are uncostructive searchers (θ < 1) and claimants
in employment (ξ > 0). Moreover, while the official unemployment rate is constrained
between 0 and 1, the same does not hold for the registered one. Obviously, this is due to
the fact that the numerator of uR may collect individuals that according to official criteria
are classified as employed or out of the labour force (cf. Battistin et al. 2006).
The equations (1.6) and (1.7) allow also the derivation of the multiplier of registered
unemployment, i.e., the ratio between registered and official job seekers. In details,
M (θ, ξ) = 1 +
1− θ
(
1− ξ
1−ξρf
(
Vf
θL
))
1− ρf
(
Vf
θL
)
θ
(1.9)
Whenever 1/θ is higher than 1 − (ξ/ (1− ξ)) ρf (·), an hypothesis which is always
verified according to the assumption set forth above, the multiplier of registered unem-
ployment is higher than 1 as shown by figure 1.3. Obviously, this is the same condition
13Assuming that only a fixed fraction of official job seekers register themselves to a CPI does not alter
the results achieved in this section.
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under which uR is higher than uH . From an empirical point of view, the theoretical ex-
pression for M (·) should be somehow related to the inverse of the ηi,g coefficients whose
estimations are collected in table 1.1.
Eq. (1.9) reveals that M (·) depends - inter alia - on θ and ξ. The expression and sign
of the respective derivatives are given by
∂M (θ, ξ)
∂θ
= −
1 + ρf
(
Vf
θL
) (
1− eρf
) (
1− θ + ξ
1−ξ
(
1 + ρf
(
Vf
θL
)
θ
))
(
1− ρf
(
Vf
θL
)
θ
)2 (1.10)
∂M (θ, ξ)
∂ξ
=
θρf
(
Vf
θL
)
(1− ξ)2
(
1− ρf
(
Vf
θL
)
θ
) > 0 (1.11)
where eρf ≡ ∂ρf (·) /∂ (Vf/θL) (Vf/θL) /ρf (·) is the elasticity of matching with respect
to labour market tightness for full positions.
As long as eρf is lower than one, an hypothesis for which there is a robust circumstan-
tial evidence abroad as well as in the Italian context (cf. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001;
Cardullo and Guerrazzi, 2016), (10) shows that the multiplier of registered unemploy-
ment over official unemployment is a decreasing function of the fraction of constructive
searchers. By contrast, according to (1.11), M (·) is an increasing function of the share of
claimants in employment.
1.4.2 Supply of vacancies
As we stated above, there are two types of firms that post different types of vacancies.
On the one hand, a worker employed in a full position generates a real revenue equal to
a > 0 and receives a real wage equal w. Under the assumption that employers who supply
a vacancy for a full position have to pay the fixed cost κ > 0, the expected profit for a
firm that post full positions is given by
πf = εf
(
θL
Vf
)
(a− w)− κ (1.12)
On the other hand, minimal jobs are assumed to be a smaller-scale version of full
positions. In other words, minimal jobs yield less to employers, are associated to lower
wage payments and imply lower search cost.14 The latter feature of minimal jobs is due
to the fact that claimants in employment are usually directed to firms with the help of
the CPI in which they registered. Consequently, the expected profit for a firm that post
minimal jobs can be written as
14Implicitly, we are assuming that jobs are perfectly divisible at level of firms. Such an assumption is
consistent with a production technology characterized by constant returns to scale.
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πm = α
(
εm
(
ξN
Vm
)
(a− w)− κ
)
0 < α < 1 (1.13)
Under free entry, both types of vacancies are supplied until the associated expected
profit is driven to zero, i.e., πf = πm = 0. Therefore, eq.s (1.12) and (1.13) imply that
each type of vacancy is equal to
Vf =
θL
ε−1f
(
κ
a−w
) (1.14)
Vm =
ξN
ε−1m
(
κ
a−w
) (1.15)
Since εi, with i = {f,m}, are supposed to be increasing functions of their respective
arguments, it follows that both types of vacancies are decreasing (increasing) functions of
the real wage and search costs (individual worker’s productivity).
1.4.3 Wage determination
The real wage w earned by workers is assumed to be the outcome of a Nash bargaining
process. On the one hand, the fallback position of workers is given by the unemployment
benefit b that also proxies the array of perquisites assigned to registered job seekers. On
the other hand, the fallback position of employers is assumed to be given by marginal
firing costs that, for the sake of simplicity, are proportional to the real wage according to
the parameter ϕ ∈ (0, 1) (cf. Coe and Snower, 1997). Consequently, under the assump-
tion that the bargaining power of workers (employers) is given by µ (1− µ), the Nash
maximandum can be written as:
max
w
(w − b)µ (a− (1− ϕ)w)1−µ (1.16)
The expression in (1.16) implies that the bargained wage is equal to
w∗ =
aµ+ b (1− µ) (1− ϕ)
1− ϕ
(1.17)
Eq. (1.17) reveals that the wage earned by workers increases with the productivity of
the individual employee, with the amount of firing costs and with the level of unemploy-
ment benefits. Moreover, as long as (a− (1− ϕ) b) / (1− ϕ) > 0 - a condition that fits
the hypothesis made above on the parameters’ model - w is an increasing function of the
bargaining power of workers.
1.4.4 Unconstructive searchers and claimants in employment
The equilibrium fraction of unconstructive searchers (1− θ∗) and the one of claimants in
employment (ξ∗) are found by assessing two distinct non-arbitrage conditions according
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to which the expected value of the search activities carried out, respectively, by official
job seekers and workers employed in minimal jobs must be equal to the value of payments
received by the two categories of workers.
On the one hand, suppose that individuals are heterogeneous in terms of their search
costs and sf (θ), with s
′
f (·) > 0 for all θ ∈ (0, 1), is a continuous function that conveys
the cumulative distribution of constructive job search costs. Consequently, ordering job
searchers in terms of their individual search costs from the lowest to the highest, sf (θ)
represents also the search cost of the marginal constructive searcher out of the proportion
θ of the labour force ordered in such a manner (cf. Coe and Snower, 1997). There-
after, in equilibrium, the marginal searcher must be indifferent between constructive and
unconstructive search, so that
ρf
(
V ∗f
θ∗L
)
w∗ +
(
1− ρf
(
V ∗f
θ∗L
))
b− sf (θ∗) = b (1.18)
where V ∗f = θ
∗L/ε−1f (κ/ (a− w∗)).
Solving eq. (1.18) for θ by taking into account the results in (1.14) and (1.17), we find
the equilibrium fraction of constructive job seekers:
θ∗ = s−1f
(
µ (a− b (1− ϕ)) ρf (ϖ)
1− ϕ
)
(1.19)
where ϖf ≡ 1/ε−1f (κ (1− ϕ) / ((1− ϕ) (a+ b (1− µ))− aµ)). Obviously, 1 − θ∗ is the
equilibrium fraction of uncontructive job seekers that - by hypothesis - register themselves
to CPIs.
In the other hand, but in a similar manner, claimants in employment must be indiffer-
ent between searching (constructively) for a full position and keeping their minimal job,
so that
ρm
(
V ∗f
ξ∗N∗
)
w∗ +
(
1− ρm
(
V ∗f
ξ∗N∗
))
αw∗ − sm (ξ∗) = αw∗ (1.20)
where N∗ = Lθ∗ρf
(
V ∗f /θ
∗L
)
/ (1− ξ∗), V ∗m = ξ∗N∗/ε−1m (κ/ (a− w∗)) whereas sm (ξ),
with s′m (·) > 0 for all ξ ∈ (0, 1), is the cumulative distribution of on-the-job search costs,
whereas ξ is the fraction of employed searchers ordered from lowest to highest in terms
of their individual search costs.
Taking into account the results in (1.15) and (1.17), eq. (1.20) can be solved for ξ to
find the equilibrium fraction of claimants in employment:
ξ∗ = s−1m
(
(1− α) ρm (ϖm) (aµ+ b (1− µ) (1− ϕ))
1− ϕ
)
(1.21)
where ϖm ≡ 1/ε−1m (κ (1− ϕ) /((1− ϕ) (a+ b (1− µ))− aµ)).
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1.4.5 Productivity shocks and policy implications
The expressions in (1.19) and (1.21) reveal that the fraction of unconstructive searchers
and the one of claimants in employment prevailing in equilibrium depends on the different
model’s parameters. Consequently, it becomes possible to asses how productivity shocks
and policy interventions aimed at modifying the underlying institutional setting of the
labour market may affect the theoretical figures of official and registered unemployment.
First, aiming at exploring the effects triggered by a downturn or by an upturn on
unconstructive searchers and claimants in employment, we begin by assessing how θ∗
and ξ∗ are influenced by variations in labour productivity. Actually, in a supply-driven
model like the one developed above, expansions (recessions) can be portrayed by increases
(reductions) in the value of a. The respective derivatives are given by
∂θ∗
∂a
= µσ∗f
(
ρf (·)
1− ϕ
+
κρ′f (·) (a− b (1− ϕ)) (1− ϕ− µ)(
Ωε−1f (·)
)2
)
(1.22)
∂ξ∗
∂a
= (1− α)σ∗m
(
µρm (·)
1− ϕ
+
κ (aµ+ b (1− µ) (1− ϕ)) (1− ϕ− µ) ρ′m (·)
(Ωε−1m (·))
2
)
(1.23)
where σ∗f ≡ ∂s−1f (·) /∂θ∗, σ∗m ≡ ∂s−1m (·) /∂ξ∗ and Ω ≡ (1− ϕ) (a+ b (1− µ))− aµ.
The sign of (1.22) and (1.23) crucially depends on the term 1 − ϕ − µ. Namely,
∂θ∗/∂a ≷ 0 and ∂ξ∗/∂a ≷ 0 if and only if 1 − ϕ − µ ≷ 0. Interestingly, according to
(1.12), (1.13) and (1.17), such a condition is satisfied when profits move in the same
direction of labour productivity. Consequently, we can state that whenever there is a
positive (negative) productivity shock the equilibrium fraction of constrictive job seekers
as well as the one of claimants in employment tend to increase (decrease). Comparing
those results with the path of the multiplier illustrated in figure 1.3 and recalling the
analytical results in (1.10) and (1.11), we notice that in the aftermath of the two major
recessive impulses that hit the Italian economy the effects driven by variations of a on
θ∗ dominated the ones on ξ∗ by signaling a discouraging effect triggered by the adverse
economic conditions. Actually, the peaks of the multiplier seem to be achieved at the two
deeps of the recessions in 2009 and 2012.
From a policy point of view, an intriguing issue that our model allows to address is the
way in which official and registered unemployment react to variations in the perquisites
and entitlements recognized to job seekers that we denoted by b. Specifically, deriving θ∗
and ξ∗ with respect to that parameter leads to
∂θ∗
∂b
= µσ∗f
(
κ (a− b (1− ϕ)) (1− ϕ) (1− µ) ρ′f (·)(
Ωε−1f (·)
)2 − ρf (·)
)
(1.24)
∂ξ∗
∂b
= (1− α) (1− µ)σ∗m
(
κ (1− ϕ) (aµ+ b (1− µ) (1− ϕ)) ρ′m (·)
(Ωε−1m (·))
2 + ρm (·)
)
> 0 (1.25)
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On the one hand, according to (1.24) and increase in b has two counterbalancing effects
on the equilibrium fraction of constructive searchers: (i) a bargaining effect given the first
term in brackets that leads to an increase in θ∗ and (ii) a moral hazard effect given by the
second one that, on the contrary, leads to a reduction in θ∗. Intuitively, the bargaining
effect works through the positive relation between the negotiated wage and b conveyed
by eq. (1.17). Consequently, the higher the wage, the higher the incentives to search in a
constructive manner. The functioning of the moral hazard effect is more intuitive. Indeed,
an increase (reduction) in the entitlements recognized to job seekers reduces (increases)
the incentives to search constructively. Interestingly, when workers have complete market
power (µ = 1), the bargaining effect disappears and we have only the moral hazard effect.
Furthermore, when workers have no market power (µ = 0), unemployment benefits have
no effect on θ∗. On the other hand, (1.25) shows that the effect of b on the equilibrium
fraction of claimants in employment is definitely positive. As we recalled above, the wage
equation in (1.17) provides a positive relationship between w∗ and b. Thereafter, the
higher the wage, the higher the incentives to look constructively for job upgrades.
Whenever the wage is assumed to be the outcome of negotiations between workers
and firms, labour market deregulation is usually modeled as a reduction of the bargaining
power of workers (cf. Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). The effect of variations in µ on θ∗
and ξ∗ are conveyed by
∂θ∗
∂µ
= (a− b (1− ϕ))σ∗f
(
ρf (·) +
µ ((1− ϕ) b+ a) ρ′f (·)(
Ωε−1f (·)
)2
)
> 0 (1.26)
∂ξ∗
∂µ
= A
(
(a− b (1− ϕ)) ρm (·)
1− ϕ
− κ (aµ+ b (1− µ) (1− ϕ)) (a+ b (1− ϕ)) ρ
′
m (·)
(Ωε−1m (·))
2
)
(1.27)
where A ≡ (1− α)σ∗m.
According to eq. (1.26), the equilibrium fraction of constructive searchers is positively
affected by the bargaining power of workers. This result is driven by the fact that the
equilibrium wage conveyed by eq. (1.17) is an increasing function of µ. Therefore, the
higher the wage, the higher the incentives to search constructively for a job. By contrast,
as revealed by eq. (1.27), the effect of the bargaining power of workers on claimants
in employment is not straightforward. In addition to the positive effect driven by µ on
w∗, there is also a counterbalancing negative effect due to the fact that when the wage
increases firms have the incentive to post less vacancies, in this case for minimal jobs.
Looking at marginal firing costs born by employers, our model allows also to stress the
way in which official and registered job seekers responds to variations in the parameter
ϕ. In details, deriving θ∗ and ξ∗ with respect to ϕ leads to
∂θ∗
∂ϕ
= aµσ∗f
(
ρf (·)
(1− ϕ)2
−
κµ (a− b (1− ϕ)) ρ′f (·)(
Ωε−1f (·)
)2
)
(1.28)
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∂ξ∗
∂ϕ
= −B
(
(aµ+ 2b (1− µ) (1− ϕ)) ρm (·)
1− ϕ
+
aκµ (aµ+ b (1− µ) (1− ϕ)) ρ′m (·)
(Ωε−1m (.))
2
)
< 0
(1.29)
where B ≡ (1− α)σ∗m/ (1− ϕ).
Eq. (1.28) shows that the effect of ϕ on the equilibrium fraction of constructive
searchers is uncertain. On the one hand, recalling some results achieved in models with
insiders and outsiders, higher firing costs allow employed workers to extract a higher
share of the rent generated by the underlying employment relationship (cf. Lindbeck and
Snower, 1989). Thus, as conveyed by eq. (1.17), there is a positive link between ϕ and
w∗ and we already know that a higher wage leads individuals to search constructively
for jobs. In the other hand, higher wages discourage firms from opening new vacancy
and this leads to a reduction of θ∗. Interestingly, the effect of ϕ on θ∗ disappears when
workers have no bargaining power (µ = 0). Furthermore, confirming a path that we have
somehow see above, the incentives that drive employers to post minimal jobs go in the
same direction of the incentives that drive claimants in employment to search for job
upgrade. In fact, eq.(1.29) shows that ξ∗ is negatively related to ϕ. In other words, higher
marginal firing costs leads employer to post lower vacancies for minimal jobs, and this
reduce the willingness of workers to search for job upgrades.
Considering the bargaining power of workers and firing costs born by firms, the period
covered by our empirical analysis encloses a wave of labour marker deregulation labeled
as Job Act (cf. Law 183/2014 and D.Lgs 23/2015). Indeed, starting in 2014 the Italian
government ratified some interventions aimed at increasing labour market flexibility and
reducing firing costs. The main novelties of the Job Act are the availability of contracts
with increasing protection instead of the traditional permanent contract and the abolition
of the prohibition of firing workers without a cause (cf. Antonioli and Pini, 2014; Catalano
and Pezzolla, 2017; Sestito and Viviano, 2016).
According to eq.s (1.26) − (1.29), our model does not have unambiguous predictions
for the effects triggered by changes in µ and ϕ. However, the available empirical evidence
illustrated in figures 1.1 and 1.3 shows a general reduction of unemployment together with
mild values of the multiplier. Such a pattern may suggest that the positive effect triggered
by lower firing cost on the fraction of constructive searchers offset the corresponding
negative effect triggered on θ∗ by the reduction of µ. Moreover, since a fraction of minimal
jobs likely became full jobs for the availability of contracts with increasing protection, it
appears reasonable to assume that the negative effect on ξ∗ triggered by the reduction of
µ outweighed the corresponding positive effect as well as the positive effect triggered by
the reduction of ϕ on the percentage of claimants in employment.
Concerning the fixed cost of vacancy posting, it plays a role as well in influencing the
equilibrium fraction of constructive searchers and claimants in employment conveyed in
the following expressions:
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∂θ∗
∂κ
= −
σ∗fµ (a− b (1− ϕ)) ρ′f (·)
Ω
(
ε−1f (·)
)2 < 0 (1.30)
∂ξ∗
∂κ
= −σ
∗
m (1− α) (aµ+ b (1− µ) (1− ϕ)) ρ′m (·)
Ω (ε−1m (·))
2 < 0 (1.31)
Eq.s (1.30) and (1.31) straightforwardly suggest that the higher the value of κ, the
lower the incentives to post vacancies, no matter the type. Therefore, the lower the
incentives to search constructively for full jobs and job upgrades.
From a policy perspective, the parameter κ can be taken as a proxy of the recruitment
efficiency of CPIs. Consequently, an increase (reduction) in matching efficiency of CPIs,
i.e., a reduction (increase) of κ does not have an univocal effect on the multiplier of reg-
istered unemployment since it leads to a reduction (increase) of unconstructive searchers
but an increase (decrease) in claimants in employment.
Finally, the fraction of claimants in employment also depends on the distance between
full and minimum job conveyed by the parameter α. The respective derivative can be
written as follows:
∂ξ∗
∂α
= −σ∗m (aµ+ b (1− µ) (1− ϕ)) ρm (·) < 0 (1.32)
Eq. (1.32) reveals that the lower the distance between minimal and full jobs, the lower
the fraction of claimants in employment.
1.5 Official and registered unemployment: Why do
we need both?
Unemployment statistics are essential in identifying policy targets in labour market, set-
ting normative standards for actions, choosing among strategic options, assisting in mak-
ing policy decisions and controlling their effectiveness. Official and registered unemploy-
ment seek to grasp the shortage of work, but they are derived in a different way. As
we notice in section 2, this leads to marked divergences among them and some flaw can
be detected in both statistics. On the one hand, official unemployment is measured via
sample surveys so it is potentially subject to errors due to heterogeneities among peo-
ple with different characteristics and mis-classification errors in the self-reported labour
force status (cf. Feng and Hu, 2013). In addition, as argued by Summers (1982), ILO
unemployment can be biased by sampling, seasonal-adjustment and sampling-variability
errors. Even the quality of interviewers’ work may be questioned in official statistics (cf.
Hazans, 2008). On the other hand, registered data are affected by the national legis-
lation that provides the eligibility criteria for registration and to claim unemployment
benefits. These criteria define a sort of participation constraint that may be unrelated to
employment hardship and ineffective in avoiding the moral hazard of potential applicants.
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In other words, jobless individuals who experience problems in submitting the required
documents to the CPI are automatically ruled out from registered statistics. Conversely,
people entitled to receive the benefits granted by registration can register themselves even
if they are not actively seeking for jobs.
Likewise, both statistics are used in different ways. On the one side, official unem-
ployment is mainly used for international comparisons, the analysis of long-term and
medium-term trends in the labour market, the analysis of labour market position of dif-
ferent socio-demographic groups, the analysis of labour market flows, the analysis of job
search activities and for the estimation of the size of the labour force. On the other
side, registered unemployment is mainly used for the analysis of short-term trends, to
forecast labour supply and labour demand in certain occupations and in certain munici-
palities, to calculate the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate and to calibrate weights
implemented to generalize the results of the labour force survey to the whole population.
Therefore, it may be important to exploit both data to overcome the limitations outlined
above and - at the same time - gather a wider idea about the unemployment situation in
a given region.
The public discussion on Italian unemployment is often characterized by the debate on
the reliability and the possible underestimation underlying official figures. In this regard,
arguing in favour of a broader definition of unemployment, some scholars suggested to
supplement the official measure of job seekers by taking into account the share of the
labour force covered by social safety valves (e.g. Cingano et al. 2010; Olivieri and
Paccagnella, 2012). By contrast, there is broad consensus on the view that provincial
records on job seekers are heavily inflated (cf. Anastasia and Disarò, 2005).
From the point of view of employment and income policies, the accurate determina-
tion of the number of people that need intervention is essential in order to calibrate the
amount of resources to be allocated and, at a later stage, evaluating their effectiveness.
In this direction, the possibilities of cross-country comparison allowed by official data are
certainly indispensable. However, from a quantitative perspective and considering the
always-mentioned reforms of social safety valves and the recent debate on the guaranteed
minimum income, the possible under-reporting problems associated with official labour
market surveys deserve to be taken in serious consideration (cf. Budlender, 2011). There
are empirical studies developed with a number of methodologies that suggest a broader
definition of unemployment with respect to the one implemented to retrieve official statis-
tics (cf. Battistin et al. 2006; Brandolini et al. 2004). Such a definition would lead to
include all the jobless individuals who declared a) to be immediately available to start
a job and b) carried out some concrete search activities without any restriction for the
period in which the latter has been actually performed. In this way, it is very likely that
some registered job seekers not surveyed by ISTAT as officially unemployed would be
fairly considered for retrieving the real magnitude of involuntary unemployed workers as
well as the quantity of labour actually supplied in the economy under scrutiny.
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In this view, administrative records on job seekers seem to constitute the proper
reference to integrate and amend official figures on unemployment (cf. Chernyshev, 2001;
Anastasia et al. 2015). For instance, aiming at amending the available measures of
unemployment, Burchard and Le Grand (2002), propose a methodological approach to
address the problem of the existence of voluntary unemployment. Obviously, people that
voluntarily decide to be unemployed should not be considered for grasping the measure of
actual employment hardship. The method implemented by Burchard and Le Grand (2002)
is based on controlling for various constraints on people’s decisions that can affect their
employment situation. These constraints are introduced sequentially according to the
extent to which they can be regarded beyond individual control. Such a procedure allows
to estimate the predicted probability of being employed and when such a probability
is above a certain threshold for a jobless individual, the individual herself should be
considered as voluntary unemployed and not considered in unemployment statistics.
In the perspective of integration, Jones and Riddell (1999) suggest an empirical pro-
cedure to assess whether people out of the labour force such as registered unconstructive
searchers may deserve to be considered as genuinely unemployed. As we noticed in sec-
tion 2, in the Italian context this can be quantitatively important especially for non-young
persons. Estimating the transition probabilities of a Markovian model in which different
labour force states are taken into account, Jones and Riddell (1999) find that a significant
share of non-searching individuals that desire to have a job is behaviourally similar to the
individuals that fulfill the criteria of official unemployment. Consequently, such a share
of individuals should be considered to evaluate the amount of under-utilization of labour
in the economy and the extent of frictional and structural mismatch.
Again on the way of integration, some attention should be paid also to registered
claimants in employment that hold very precarious positions. For instance, Thomas
(1998) argues that claimants in employment have a dynamic behaviour which is very
close to official unemployment so that a fraction of them should be taken into account to
evaluate the real extent of actual unemployment.
Furthermore, considering the possibilities of updating and the quantity of informa-
tion that could be gathered by CPIs, administrative archives could be exploited to build
longitudinal databases. Thereafter, those panels of data should be used to monitor the
dynamics of unemployment and to evaluate the effectiveness of policy aimed at bringing
people into employment. However, as argued by Trivellato (2003, 2006), more than an
integration among official data and administrative records, the most sensible thing to do
would be the creation of a national information system of labour - or a national labour
accounting system - with the task to organize and process data coming from different
statistical sources. Within the European context, Italian authorities had repeatedly com-
mitted themselves to ensure that all public administrations endowed with competencies
in labor market issues should become able to develop statistical indicators for implement-
ing and controlling active policy interventions. Unfortunately, these ambitious projects,
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announced several times, have not yet been realized.
1.6 Concluding remarks
This paper addresses some issues concerning the measurement of unemployment in the
Italian regional context. Specifically, retrieving data from Tuscany, we compare the pic-
ture of unemployment that emerges by exploring official data released by ISTAT and
administrative records collected by regional CPIs over the last ten years on a quarterly
basis.
From an empirical point of view, consistently with previous findings, we find that
registered unemployment is higher, more persistent and more concentrated on women
than its official measure (cf. Barbieri et al. 2000; Anastasia and Disarò, 2005; Guerrazzi,
2012). However, despite these heterogeneities, we show that the stock of registered job
seekers conveys a cyclical information about labour market performance that goes in
the same direction of the one indicated by official unemployment. Specifically, we show
that official and registered unemployed tend to move together along the cycle and are
both negatively correlated to regional employment. By contrast, we give evidence that
such a cyclical information is missing from the inflows into registered unemployment.
Moreover, we provide an empirical procedure to reconcile registered unemployment to
official unemployment that is fairly able to replicate the long-run trend of the latter.
Thereafter, we develop a search model that provides a rationale for the coexistence of
official and registered job seekers by deriving the analytical expression of the multiplier
of registered unemployment, i.e., the ratio between registered and official job seekers. A
comparative statics analysis carried out within our theoretical framework allows to clarify
some features of observed data such as the increase of the multiplier observed after the
two recent recession waves as well as some of the (un)employment effects of the labour
market deregulation triggered by the Job Act. In details, recessions appear to be followed
by an increase of unconstructive searchers whereas the Job Act seems to have lead to
a reduction of claimants in employment and a contemporaneous increase of constructive
searchers (cf. Antonioli and Pini, 2014; Catalano and Pezzolla, 2017; Sestito and Viviano,
2016).
Finally, we offer some insights on how to integrate and amend official and administra-
tive data on unemployment. Specifically, we suggest the advisability to rule out voluntary
unemployment, the need to consider a fraction of unconstructive searchers and claimant
in employment as genuinely unemployed and the importance to build longitudinal data
on jobless individuals to monitor unemployment with more details (cf. Burchard and Le
Grand, 2002; Jones and Riddell, 1999; Trivellato, 2003, 2006).
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Chapter 2
The Registration in Italian Public
Employment Agencies: Motivations
and Determinants
2.1 Overview
In this paper, I investigate some issues related to the measure of unemployment by using
microdata from the Italian labour force survey. First, by cross-checking registered individ-
uals in public employment agencies and official unemployment, I show that only 50% of
the formers are unemployed according to official criteria. Moreover, I analyse some of the
reasons that lie behind the heterogeneity between official and registered unemployment
with a special focus on the determinants of the decision to register in public employment
agency to search for work. By using a probability model, I show that the eligibility for un-
employment benefits and the participation to vocational training programs substantially
affect the decision to register.
2.2 Introduction
Consistently to the pattern observed in other developed countries, in Italy there are
significant differences between unemployment levels that official statistics declare and
those that administrative records report. Official or harmonised data on unemployment
are collected by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) whereas administrative
or registered records on unemployment are the stock of enrolled unemployed individuals
in Public Employment Agencies (PEA).
Typically, registered unemployment in Italy exceeds by three times the unemployment
declared by ISTAT. For example, Barbieri et al. (2001) find that registered unemployment
is higher than official unemployment by 1, 1 million individuals. Anastasia and Disarò
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(2005) compare individuals registered in PEAs with official unemployment in the Region of
Veneto and conclude that only 35% of PEAs’ customers can be considered as unemployed
by official statistics. Guerrazzi (2012) makes a comparison between official statistic with
administrative records in the Province of Pisa and finds that registered unemployment
is 3.57 times the official figure. More recently, Guerrazzi and Ksebi (2018) shows that
administrative unemployment is 3.64 times the official unemployment all over the Region
of Tuscany and provide a model to explain the magnitude of such a multiplier.
The unemployment rate is an essential indicator of a country’s economic performance
and its population’s well being. Therefore, the issue of measuring unemployment received
considerable attention in the literature. Along these lines, Kyriacou et al. (2009) claim
that registered unemployment is way higher than official unemployment in Cyprus. Sim-
ilarly, Hwang (2010) argues that official statistics underestimate the real unemployment
rate in Korea by comparing LFS-based unemployment to several administrative data
sources. In contrast, Wang and Sun (2014) using survey’s data conclude that registered
unemployment is lower than official unemployment in China. Furthermore, Konle-Seidl
and Ludeke (2017) investigate discrepancies between registered unemployment and inter-
nationally harmonized unemployment in a comparative view in ten selected EU-countries
and they find that registered unemployment is lower than official unemployment in Swe-
den, Spain whereas the opposite holds in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Netherlands and Poland.
Generally speaking, many countries suffer from inaccessibility to a reliable indicator
of the unemployment rate. Furthermore, the step that precedes correcting unemployment
statistics is understanding the reasons behind the heterogeneity between the two main
sources of statistics on unemployment. The latter typically attributes to reasons classi-
fied into two broad categories: methodological and behavioural economic reasons. One
the one hand, the methodological reasons are essentially three. First, sampling errors in
official statistics. In other words, since official statistics are gathered via sample survey,
so they potentially subject to sampling errors due to the heterogeneities among people
with different characteristics and misclassification errors in the self-reported labour force
status (cf. Xu, 2012). Second, administrative records have updating issues that occur
when individuals remain in administrative statistics even after they start working or stop
searching for a job (cf. Olivieri, 2009). Finally, there exists a mismatch in the unemploy-
ment definition adopted by official statistics and registered records. Therefore, a major
share of the differences in unemployment indicators attributes to the classification adopted
to distribute individuals in unemployment, employment and inactivity (cf. Brandolin et
al., 2004).
On the other hand, the behavioural economics perspective points out that the effect of
cognitive biases and behavioural barriers on the registration decision in PEAs may alter
the gap between official and registered unemployment. For example, the eligibility criteria
for unemployment benefits usually rule out people without former work experiences (cf.
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Crepaldi et al., 2014). In fact, in many Western European countries more than half of
individuals eligible for social assistance do not receive it (cf. Bouckaert and Schokkaert,
2011; Bruckmeier and Wiemers, 2011; Amétépé, 2012; Domingo and Pucci, 2014; Dubois
and Ludwinek, 2014). Eligible unemployed leaves unemployment benefits for many rea-
sons such as incomplete information regarding benefits and eligibility, transaction costs,
and registration complexity (cf. Currie 2004; Bhargava and Manoli, 2012). In addition,
it is worth noting the lack of knowledge about services provided by PEAs (cf. Wang and
Sun 2014).
Italian employment agencies are decentralised to Regions (Regioni – NUTS2), while
the everyday running of the public employment services, in turn, is decentralised to
Provinces (Province – NUTS3) (cf. European Comission (EC), 2016). For this rea-
son, there may be some geographical differences in classifying individuals into employed
and unemployed, in the sense that employment agencies’ definitions of unemployment
may be inconsistent among each other. Additionally, administrative unemployment lacks
essential information about unemployment features that may be useful in investigating
detailed aspects of the heterogeneities between unemployment statistics such as unem-
ployment duration, previous work experience, etc. Consequently, administrative data on
unemployment are not available at the country level. For the reasons mentioned above,
it has been a common practice to compare administrative to harmonised statistics using
two distinct methods. On the one hand, using macro data considering single areas within
the country (cf. Anastasia and Disarò, 2005; Guerazzi 2012; Guerrazzi and Ksebi 2018).
On the other hand, studies on the country level using self-reported answers from the LFS
survey that include questions about enrolling in employment agencies (cf. Barbieri et al.,
2001).
Following the latter research line, this paper contributes to the existing literature on
measuring unemployment in two ways. On the one hand, it uses the latest published LFS
figures to conduct a cross-check on administrative unemployment with official statistics.
Consistently with the previous studies recalled above, I find that only 50% of registered
unemployment can be defined as unemployed according to official statistics. Additionally,
only 26% of unemployed individuals used a PEA as a part of their searching strategy.
On the other hand, the present paper explores the sources of the discrepancy between
statistics on unemployment with an emphasis on the determinants underlying the decision
of officially unemployed individuals to enroll in PEAs. In this regards, I find that attending
qualification courses encouraged unemployment registration, as found by Wang and Sun,
(2005); indeed, it is highly possible that following vocational training courses increase
individuals’ information about PEAs’ services thus encourage registration. Furthermore,
I find that heterogeneity in the determinants of registration among unemployed with
previous work experience (PWE) and among unemployed without PWE and this suggests
that the eligibility for unemployment benefits alter the likelihood of relying on PEAs.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 provides the background concerning
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official and registered unemployment. Section 3 represents data and descriptive statistics.
Section 4 examines the determinants of registering in a PEA. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2.3 Background
The official statistic relies on general guidelines set by the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO) aimed at classifying individuals into three categories: employment, unem-
ployment and inactive or “out of labour force”. Konle-Seidl and Lüdeke (2017) argues
that ILO classification for labour market segments are very strict and barely reflects re-
ality as there are individuals situated in between employment and unemployment and in
between unemployment and inactivity. For example, ILO considers who works for paid
employment for at least one hour during a reference period as an employed, which may
not reflect the actual situation of job-seekers.
On the one side, official unemployment includes all individuals within the working-age
that – during a reference period – were: i) jobless; ii) available to work; and iii) actively
seeking a job. Inactive or “out of the labour force” are individuals that are neither em-
ployed nor unemployed. On the other side, registered unemployment is simply the count
of individuals that are registered as job-seekers in public employment agencies (PEAs).
A PEA is a public institution where people enrol to claim unemployment benefits and get
job-search assistance. In Italy, PEAs are named as “centri per l’impiego”. The activity of
PEAs is designed in order to combine visitors autonomous retrieval of information with
assistance from professional job counselors. Enrolling in Italian PEAs and counseling in-
terviews are free of charge. The fruition of PEA services is conditional on being available
to work. From a statistical point of view, data gathered by PEAs is mainly useful for
analysis of short-term trends, such as forecasting labour supply and demand in certain
occupations, calculating the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate. On the contrary,
official statistics are helpful in long term analysis and across countries comparisons.
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
The analysis in this paper relies on the cross-section microdata of the Italian Labour
Force Survey (LFS) from the first quarter of 2008 until the second quarter of 2019. The
LFS is one of the most important statistical sources about the Italian labour market, and
it carried out every quarter by ISTAT. Participant names are randomly extracted from
population lists containing the names of all families residing in the municipality and then
contacted to participate. Interviewees’ answers are used to compile data on employment,
unemployment and inactivity. Employed individuals reply to various questions about their
current and previous work background. Individuals without a job provide information on
the aspects behind their labour situation in addition to past work activities information.
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Furthermore, the LFS is the only survey that collects job-searching intensity indicators. In
addition to the rich individual and demographic variables and the large sample provided.
A section oriented to all participants is dedicated to information on employment services
and employment agencies where participants are asked detailed questions about their
contact with PEAs. Therefore, employed individuals can supply information about the
role of government employment agencies in finding their actual occupations.
Looking at a sample of newly employed individuals that were searching for work
through a PEA the year before the interview, data suggest that only 6.3% of them matched
to their current positions through an employment agency. In fact, in the last decade, there
have been an intense debate about the effectiveness of the Italian public employment ser-
vices (cf. Barbieri et al., 2001; Naticchioni and Loriga, 2011). Table 2.1 allows the
comparison between the characteristics of individuals and their current positions’
Jobs found by PEA Jobs found without PEA
Observations 3, 365 49, 555
i) Workers charactiristics
Gender (Male) 54% 53%
Nationality (Italians) 94% 90%
Age class
15-24 9% 12%
25-34 19% 30%
35-44 25.57% 30%
45-54 30% 21%
Education
High school or less 53% 46%
Diploma 2-3 years 10% 9%
Diploma 4 years or less 37% 44%
ii) Jobs characteristics
Part-time jobs 39% 38%
Weekly working hours (part time)
Mean 31.55 31.89
SD 12.44 10.29
Determinant work agreement % 75.38 60.01
Table 2.1: Characteristics of jobs matched by PEAs versus other jobs
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Jobs found by PEA Jobs found without PEA
Monthly wage in Euros
Mean 829 850
SD 356 395
Company size
Small less than 10 30% 48%
Large more than 50 21% 14%
Occupations classification
Mean 4.1 4.4
SD 1.9 1.9
Sector
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 16% 6%
Industry 8% 11%
Construction 9% 12%
Trade 8% 12%
Hotels and restaurants 7% 13%
Transport and storage 4% 7%
Information and communication services 3% 3%
Financial and insurance activities 1% 1%
Real estate activities, business, entrepreneurial 11% 11%
Public administration, social insurance 13% 2%
Education, health and other social services 14% 10%
Other collective and personal services 7% 12%
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
(Continues) Table 2.1: Characteristics of jobs matched by PEAs versus other jobs
that are matched to jobs through PEAs, versus individuals that found their jobs
using other searching methods. In comparison, there are no fundamental differences
among both groups regarding payment, working hours, company size and occupations
classification1. However, some heterogeneity seems to arise in workers’ age and working
sector. Employed through PAEs tend to be more contracted around older age groups.
Moreover, jobs provided by PEAs are characterized by relating mostly to the public sector,
such as agriculture, public administration, social insurance, education, health and other
social services. Furthermore, jobs in hotels and restaurants and professions related to
trade and other collective and personal services appear to be matched more frequently
1The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) is an ILO classification structure
for organizing information on labour and jobs. It is part of the international family of economic and social
classifications of the United Nations. The current version, known as ISCO-08, was published in 2008 and
is the fourth iteration, following ISCO-58, ISCO-68 and ISCO-88 (cf. International Labour Office, 2012).
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out of PEAs. Lastly, the most effective PEA appears to be in the Lazio region, followed
by Tuscany, see figure 2.1. The effectiveness of PEAs is calculated as the fraction of
employed individuals that have found a job through a PEA of all employed individuals
that were unemployed one month before the interview.
Figure 2.1: PEA effectiveness by region
2.4.1 Public employment agencies’ users
In this section, multiple cross-checks will be conducted between a group of registered
unemployment and its components of official labour market segments to uncover some
sources of the discrepancy between official and registered statistics. As mentioned earlier,
registered unemployment is the stock of enrolled individuals in public employment agen-
cies to search for employment. In Italy, registered individuals in PAEs may remain in the
unemployment archives for years and at the same time have no contacts with a PEA in
recent job search. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to define all individuals that
declare enrolling in a PEA as registered unemployment. Additionally, the 14th Interna-
tional Conference of Labour Statisticians specified that the registration in PEA should be
considered an active step to seek work only when it is for the purpose of obtaining a job
offer, as opposed to cases where registration is merely an administrative requirement for
the receipt of certain social benefits (cf. Hussmanns, 2007). Consequently, I argue that
it is possible to establish a more appropriate group of registered unemployment by using
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active registrations in the month before the interview. Accordingly, a group of registered
unemployment will be conducted by using the combination of two questions: 1) In the
previous month, were you enrolled in a PEA, or was your registration still valid? 2) Have
you registered in PEA to search for a job? Individuals that have answered yes for both
question are considered among the sample of registered unemployment.
Furthermore, the LFS reports the current labour status for interviewed persons broken
down by eight segments, defined as follows:
1. Employed;
2. Jobseeker, with previous work experience, ex-worker;
3. Jobseeker, without previous work experience, ex-inactive;
4. Jobseeker, without previous work experience;
5. Inactive, not actively searching but available;
6. Inactive, searching but not available;
7. Inactive, not searching but available;
8. Inactive, not searching and not available;
Status 1 represents the employment group (ILO/LFS employment). Status 2 {4
represent unemployment (ILO/LFS unemployment). Whereas, status 5{8 is the non-
participation group (ILO/LFS inactivity).
4,457,778 in the working age
7,335,804 LFS 
observations
4,319,200 in the reference period
were not registered in a PEA
138,579 in the reference period were
registered in a PEA
17% Employed according 
to ILO/LFS
50% Unemployed 
according to ILO/LFS
33 % inactive according to 
ILO/LFS
Figure 2.2: Registered unemployment by ILO/LFS labour status
Registered unemployment tend to include individuals that classified employment, un-
employment, and inactive according to official statistics. The diagram in figure 2.2 il-
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lustrates the group of registered unemployment broken down by the primary ILO/LFS
labour status. The full LFS sample all over the period of study includes information about
7, 335, 804 individuals. Only 4, 457, 778 of the sample are in the working-age, and 138, 579
of them have an active registration in a PEA in the month before the interview; thus they
are the registered unemployment group. Moreover, 17% of PEAs’ registered individuals
are classified as employed in LFS sample, whereas 33% are inactive. However, only 50% of
registrations belong to officially unemployed individuals. figure 2.3 displays a cross-check
of enrolled individuals in PEAs and their labour market status in the ILO/LFS
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Figure 2.3: Patterns of PEAs use
standards between 2008 and 2018. Over the observation period, a decrease in the num-
ber of ILO employment is shown among the registered unemployment segment. In par-
ticular, in 2008 the fraction of employed individuals among the registered unemployment
group was around 20% rather than 15% of total registrations in 2018. Those registered
jobseekers are working, registered in the employment agencies as unemployed, available
to work, but violated ILO definition for unemployment by stating that they had worked
at least one hour in the day before the interview. Indeed, 43% of ILO employment that
are registered in PEAs are part-time workers. Additionally, employment agencies support
workers that are searching for another job. Consequently, those workers may not be in-
cluded among the administrative unemployment count even if they are registered. In fact,
33% of the ILO employment that are registered in PEAs stated that they are searching
for another job. Furthermore, around 33% of registered individuals are defined by ILO
as inactive people. Persons that are registered in employment agencies but are outside
the labour force includes, among others, full-time students, people engaged in household
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or family duties full time, and retired individuals. In this regard, Coe and Snower (1997)
define inactive individuals that register in PEAs as unconstructive jobseekers, not willing
to work; they are merely pretending to search for qualifying for unemployment benefits.
Moreover, in 2008 ILO/unemployed individuals formed less than 40% of the PEAs
registrations. However, this fraction reached almost 50% by the end of 2018. That to say
that official unemployment became slightly closer to registered unemployment during the
last decade. Barbieri et al. (2000) have documented that between 1992 and 1999, only
40% of registered unemployed were unemployed according to the official standards. This
improvement is probably due to the public employment services reforms in 1997, 2000,
and 2003 (cf. Naticchioni and Loriga, 2011). Notwithstanding, a 50% level of congruence
between registered and official unemployment is still meagre.
Unemployed individuals enrol in a PEA to ask for assistance in finding a job or for
other reasons. However, many job seekers decide not to use an agency’s support. Scholars
record that unemployment span has a positive influence on PEAs’ use (cf. Wang and Sun,
2014; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996) and a high rate of employment agencies use recorded
among younger individuals (cf. Kuhn and Skuterud, 2000). Additionally, Wang and Sun
(2014) add that awareness of government training programs encourages unemployed co-
horts to register. Table 2.2 allows us to compare registered unemployment to unregistered
unemployment. Only 26% of officially unemployed individuals
Unregistered in PEA Registered in PEA T-test
Observations 190, 121 68, 781
Gender (Male) 51.19% 54.33%
Previous work experience
YES 71% 82%
Independent 16.24% 9.51%
Age class
15-24 22.35% 19.67%
25-34 28.66% 25.64%
35-44 23.82% 26.06%
45-54 18.05% 21.24%
Duration of unemployment
Mean 23.07 17.24 −5.83∗∗∗
SD 32.40 24.45
N. of job hunting methods
Mean 3.16 3.71 0.55∗∗∗
SD 1.64 1.76
Table 2.2: Registered unemployment versus unregistered unemployment
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Unregistered in PEA Registered in PEA
Qualification course (In the past) 10.75% 14.97 %
Education
Middle school or less 44% 45%
Diploma 2-3 years 7% 9%
Diploma 4-5 years or more 48% 46%
Occupations classification
Mean 3.26 2.73
SD 2.56 2.31
Sector
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 5.41% 4.44%
Industry 9.62% 12.9%
Construction 16.16% 18.54%
Trade 14.15% 14.42%
Hotels and restaurants 14.53% 13.2%
Transport and storage 7.24% 7.22%
Information and communication services 2.63% 2.06%
Financial and insurance activities 1.05% 0.83%
Real estate activities, business, entrepreneurial 9.35% 8.97%
Public administration, social insurance 2.05% 2.09%
Education, health and other social services 6.47% 5.62%
Other collective and personal services 11.33% 9.71%
(Continues) Table 2.2: Registered unemployment versus unregistered unemployment
were registered as unemployed in a PEA. In addition, a higher registration rates among
individuals with previous work experience were found, especially dependent workers, as
well as among older people, and low education segments. Moreover, registered unemployed
seem to have less unemployment duration that unregistered unemployment, the test of
the difference in means suggest that this difference is almost six months2. The variation in
unemployment duration implies that unemployed individuals, on average, register in the
first six months of their unemployment spell. Moreover, a slight difference was observed
in the occupations classification3 between registered and unregistered unemployment.
Furthermore, 15% of the registered group has attended qualification courses in the
past, whereas this fraction is lower among unregistered unemployed. Therefore, attending
formation courses is expected to have a positive correlation with the registration decision.
Moreover, a search intensity indicator was calculated as the number of methods that
the interviewed individuals were using – excluding enrolling in a PEA – for seeking a
2T-test is significant at 0.001 with a value of 6.2
3T-test is significant at 0.001 with a value of 0.52
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job. The minimum value of the search intensity indicator is 0 whereas the maximum is
10. The search intensity indicator tells us that unregistered unemployed seem to hunt
job opportunities intensively just as registered unemployment. The previous indicator
suggests that unemployed persons avoid registration in employment agencies not because
they are less committed to finding a job, but probably because they do not believe in
employment agencies’ effectiveness. A proper probability model will be run in the next
section to test hypotheses launched in this section.
2.5 The probability of registration
2.5.1 Empirical design
In this section, a probability model will be run to test the likelihood of registration in
a PEA for the i-th unemployed individual according to official statistics as an attempt
to understand the factors that encourage/discourage official unemployment decision to
enroll in PEAs. The detection of the determinants of registration may form an essential
step in the path of improving official and registered unemployment comparability.
Let Yi be the binary choice variable that takes value 1 if the person is registered and
0 otherwise in the year before the interview. The basic model is of the form
P (Yi = 1|Xi) = F (a+ b′Xi) (2.1)
where a and b are vectors of unknown parameters and Xi a vector of determinants
whereas F denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution.
The independent variables in equation (2.1) belong to three broad categories: i) in-
dividual characteristics; ii) labour market indicators; iii) behavioral patterns based on
individuals’ access and knowledge of governmental programs. A more detailed explana-
tion of the independent variables is required and is as follows. Individual characteristics
collect four variables: migration status, education, age, and marital status. Those vari-
ables are essential to predict the registration decision because these factors directly affect
the labour supply behaviour and often age relates to the eligibility of unemployment ben-
efits based on the length of previous work experiences. Labour market variables consist
of three groups: job searching intensity indicator which is expressed as the number of
methods that the job seeker is using to hunt occupation, unemployment pressure indi-
cator represented by the unemployment duration in months, and information about the
previous job – if applicable – such as occupations classification and job sector. Lastly,
the behavioural patterns for registration differ drastically on an individual’s knowledge of
governmental programs consequently participated in government-provided qualifications
courses in the past in an indicator to test the behavioural pattern since it should alter
individual’s information about the services provided by PEAs and thus it is expected to
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boost the likelihood of registration within an employment agency as stated by Wang and
Sun (2014).
The registration at a PEA is rewarding from several aspects as it delivers benefits
such as personnel management, training and other job searching assistance, in addition
to the possibility to claim unemployment benefits. Therefore, individuals’ decision in
PEAs’ enrolling is expected to alter dramatically depending on whether or not they are
eligible for the payment of the unemployment insurance. In Italy, if the unemployed
person has never contributed in the past to the social insurance system through a previous
occupation, then he cannot claim financial unemployment support. Therefore, I claim that
it would be proper to use previous work experience (PWE) as a proxy for the eligibility. In
other words, unemployed individuals with previous work experience include eligible and
ineligible candidates for unemployment benefits. On the contrary, unemployed people
without PWE are definitely ineligible for unemployment financial support. Therefore,
instead of entering PWE as a variable dummy, I would run the regression in equation (2.1)
in two steps. First, using the sample of unemployed without PWE that are not eligible
for unemployment benefits (model A). Second, using unemployed with PWE (model B).
Finally, year, survey year, survey quarter, and region fixed effects will be added, and the
marginal effects of the independent variables will be extracted to ensure the robustness
of the analysis.
2.5.2 Results and discussion
The results of the marginal effects of the two probability models are illustrated in table
2.3. The dependent variables in both columns are whether the unemployed individual
is registered with an PEA or not. The left column (model A), consists of unemployed
individuals without PWE, thus, they are not qualified to claim unemployment insurance.
Whereas, the right column (model B) contains individuals with previous work experience.
In both models (A and B), immigrants seem to have a lower probability in PAEs’ reg-
istration than Italians. Precisely, model A suggests that an unemployed immigrant in
Italy have a 14% less likelihood to register in an PEA than Italian. This results may be
driven by the fact that PEAs in Italy do not provide copies of its instructions in foreign
languages. Therefore, the immigrant may find it complicated to enroll in a PEA to ask
for assistance in finding a job. In fact, the unemployed foreign registration probability
becomes slightly closer to an Italian citizen in model B when individuals have PWE, an
explanation for this might be that the immigrant would apply extra effort to understand
the registration mechanism if he is eligible for unemployment support. Age as well shows
a different pattern in both models. The age effect among not eligible individuals is not
clear, however, the age effect is evidently positive and progressive in model B. An ex-
planation for this might be the positive correlation between age and years of working
experience which alter the value of
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Without PWE (A) With PWE (B)
i) Individual characteristics
Gender (Male) 0.62 (0.00) -1.9∗∗∗(0.00)
Nationality (Italian) 14.2∗∗∗(0.00) 10.2∗∗∗(0.00)
Age 25-34 0.14 (0.00) 3.96∗∗∗(0.00)
Age 35-44 02.67∗(0.01) 5.97∗∗∗(0.00)
Age 55-64 3.97∗(0.01) 6.74∗∗∗(0.00)
Age 55-64 0.71 (0.03) 7.78∗∗∗(0.00)
Education (base: high school or less)
Diploma 2-3 years 5.04∗∗∗(0.01) 1.73∗∗(0.00)
Diploma 4 years or less 0.0495*** (0.00) -0.86∗(0.00)
Marital status
Married 4.94∗∗∗(0.01) 2.32∗∗∗(0.00)
Separated or Divorced 4.49*∗(0.02) 0.79(0.00)
Widowed -2.84 (0.04) 0.68(0.01)
ii) Labour market indicators
N. of searching methods (base: 3+)
”0” 25.2∗∗∗(0.05) 12.7∗∗∗(0.02)
”1” -13.7∗∗∗(0.00) -10.3∗∗∗(0.00)
”2” -9.85∗∗∗(0.00) -5.66∗∗∗(0.00)
Unemployment spell (base: less than a month)
From one to three months 10.3∗∗∗(0.02) 6.61∗∗∗(0.00)
From three to six months 21∗∗∗(0.02) 7.05∗∗∗(0.00)
From six months to a year 24.8∗∗∗(0.02) 8.02∗∗∗(0.00)
More than a year 31.3∗∗∗(0.02) 7.10∗∗∗(0.00)
Previous work information
Occupations classification (base: Service-sales)
Professional -11.7∗∗∗(0.00)
Technicians and associate professionals -3.98∗∗∗(0.00)
Table 2.3: The marginal effects of the registration probability in PEAs
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Without PWE (A) With PWE (B)
Office occupations 2.62∗∗∗(0.00)
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers -0.46(0.00)
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 2.89∗∗∗(0.00)
Office occupations 2.62∗∗∗(0.00)
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 2.89∗∗∗(0.00)
Elementary occupations 2.91∗∗∗(0.00)
Sector (base: other personal services)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing -1.68(0.00)
Industry 5.97∗∗∗(0.00)
Construction 3.5∗∗∗(0.00)
Trade 0.9(0.00)
Hotels and restaurants 0.93(0.00)
Transport and storage 3.69∗∗(0.01)
Information and communication services 0.39(0.01)
Financial and insurance activities 1.74(0.01)
Real estate activities, business, entrepreneurial 2.54∗∗∗(0.00)
Public administration, social insurance 5.41∗∗∗(0.01)
Education, health and other social services 3.56∗∗∗(0.00)
i) Behavioural variable
Qualifications course participation in the past 16.2∗∗∗(0.01) 9.12∗∗∗(0.00)
Year, region, and survey quarter fixed effect YES YES
Observations 20159 48896
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses
(Continues) Table 2.3: The marginal effects of the registration probability in PEAs (%)
unemployment benefits that a person can ask and thus boost the registration likeli-
hood as found by Crepaldi et al., (2014). A u-shaped pattern is found among educational
segments in both models, with a maximum registration probability among first-level uni-
versity graduates. Marital status has a more clear pattern among individuals that are
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without PWE. Married and divorced individuals have from 4% to 5% higher probability
of registering than unemployed that are single. An explanation for this might be the
increasing responsibility that might create pressure to find a job as sooner as possible. As
for the labour market indicator in table 2.4, the job search intensity indicator suggests
that using other searching method lowers the probability to register in PEAs. Accord-
ingly, unemployed person that actively searching for a job using several searching methods
they do not necessarily consider enrolling in PAE as an option. For example, individuals
with PWE that do not use any searching method they have registration probability that
is 25% than individuals that uses more than three job searching methods. This means
PAEs (customers) they mostly count only on the PEA to find them an occupation.
The duration of unemployment is negatively related to the enrollment decision in
PEAs in both models: the longer the unemployment spell, the less is the probability of
enrolling in PEAs subsequently.
Finally, qualifications courses that have been followed in the past – as expected – rises
the registration probability by 16.2% for unemployed individuals without PWE, whereas,
unemployed with PWE have 9.12% higher probability of registering than individuals that
did not follow training course. This result is in line with the finding by Wang and Sun
(2014) that they conclude that the vocational training provided by public authorities raise
the awareness of the services and programs provided by PEAs, thus, boost the registration
likelihood.
2.6 Concluding remarks
This paper used a large sample of the LFS to investigate some issues related to measur-
ing unemployment in the Italian context. First, by using self-reported questions about
registration in Public Employment Agencies (PEAs), I constructed a group of individuals
with active registrations, and I compared it to their labour status according to official
statistics. I found that 17% of registered unemployment was employed according to offi-
cial statistics, whereas 33% were out of the labour force and only 50% of the registered
individuals were classified unemployed in the official standards. Besides, I found that
only 26% of unemployed individuals in official statistics were using a PEA as part of their
job-search strategy.
Further, I investigated the sources of the heterogeneity between official and registered
unemployment, in particular, the determinants of an unemployed decision to enroll in a
PEA. By conducting a model for the registration probability for individuals that are with-
out previous work experience (PWE) so illegible for unemployment benefits, and another
model for individuals without PWE so may or may not be eligible. I found that personal
characteristics and labour market variables significantly differed between individuals with
and without PWE, which confirms that eligibility for unemployment benefits alters the
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registration decision. Moreover, I found that participation in qualification courses in the
past has a positive influence on the unemployed person decision in using a PEA as part
of job searching strategy, as it raises the awareness of the agencies’ services.
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Chapter 3
Are they Over Satisfied? The Gap
between Subjective and Objective
Position of Immigrants in the Italian
Labour Market
3.1 Overview
By objective standards, the situation of immigrants in the labour market tends to be
worse than that of natives. Yet some subgroups of the immigrant population report rel-
atively higher levels of perceived income and job satisfaction than native-born workers.
This paper investigates this matter in two steps using a large sample of workers from the
Italian Labour Force Survey. First, the determinants of objective labour market position
and subjective work perceptions are assessed separately, particularly from the perspective
of gender and migration status but also taking into account other personal characteristics
of workers and labour market variables. Second, this paper estimates the gap between
subjective work perceptions and objective work status, breaking it down by various dimen-
sions. Results indicate that female immigrants and immigrants from developing countries
report higher income and job satisfaction than natives when considering the actual job
position.1
3.2 Introduction
Over the past decades, European countries have received a significant inflow of immi-
grants. According to Eurostat, the total number of people living in an EU Member State
1This work is supported by a public grant overseen by the French National Research Agency (ANR-
18-CE22-0013-01).
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with citizenship of a non-member country on 1 January 2018 was 22.3 million, represent-
ing 4.4% of the EU-28 population. As shown in figure 3.1, the largest share of recent
population growth in Europe is due to immigration. In fact, in the absence of a net inflow
of migrants, the size of the European population would have fallen by one per cent be-
tween 2000 and 2015 instead of growing by two per cent (UN, 2017). Economic research
on migration provides clear evidence that immigrants have a positive impact on unskilled
native workers’ achievements in the labour market. For example, newcomers can affect
the wages, employment, and occupational mobility of natives (cf. Foged and Peri, 2016),
mainly due to an increase in productivity and competitiveness (cf. Borjas, 1990). For the
reasons just mentioned, combined with Europe’s ageing population problem, the labour-
market performance of immigrants in their host country is a crucial issue that needs to
be studied in depth.
Figure 3.1: Population change by component (annual rates), EU-28 1960-2018,Source:
Eurostat (online data code: demo gind)
Through work, an individual can achieve financial independence, thus acquiring more
freedom. Additionally, work gives individuals a chance to find purpose by committing to
something essential; it also makes them feel valued (cf. Blomberg et al., 2008). More-
over, correlation, multiple regression, and canonical correlation analyses all point to a
positive relationship between job satisfaction and job performance (cf. Pincus, 1986).
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Researchers have therefore started to analyse the subjective parameters associated with
an individual’s position in the labour market, such as job satisfaction and its determinants.
Women thus tend to report higher job satisfaction than men (cf. Clark, 1997). Glenn and
Weaver (1982) attempted to explain this finding by suggesting that women’s educational
attainment is lower than men’s on average, which may lower their expectations and in-
crease their relative job satisfaction as a result. Ross and Reskin (1992) confirmed that
education and job satisfaction are positively correlated for highly educated individuals.
Meanwhile, Benin and Nienstedt (1985) explored other factors related to job satisfaction
and provided evidence of the positive correlation between marital happiness and job sat-
isfaction. Besides, company size has been found to be inversely related to job satisfaction
(cf. Worthy, 1950; Baumgartel and Sobol, 1959; Talacchi, 1960). Job satisfaction has also
been shown to be negatively correlated with age until 31, after which it starts increasing
again with age, as stated by Clark et al. (1996). Additionally, migration scholars have
studied immigrant satisfaction from various perspectives. Controlling for personal char-
acteristics, immigrants have been found to have either lower life satisfaction (cf. Graham
and Markowitz, 2011; Otrachshenko and Popova, 2014; Chindarkar, 2014) or higher life
satisfaction than natives (cf. Bartram, 2013). However, their overall life satisfaction de-
creases as the duration of stay in the destination country increases (cf. Obućina, 2013).
Likewise, several investigations have been made into job satisfaction among immigrants
(cf. Jong et al., 2002; Van Praag et al. 2010; Amit and Riss, 2014; Kifle et al., 2016).
Immigrant job satisfaction is directly related to ethnic identity (cf. Valdivia and Flores,
2012). However, these prominent studies fail to address whether job (dis)satisfaction is a
direct result of the worker’s actual position in the labour market, or whether it is merely
a matter of high (or low) expectations.
In parallel, a large body of studies have addressed the determinants of labour-market
achievements from an objective perspective. For instance, Altonji and Blank (1999) pro-
vide evidence of a gender wage gap in favour of men. Several migration scholars have
found the position of immigrants in the host labour market to be worse than the native-
born population’s position (cf. De Beijl, 2000; Kaas and Manger,2012; Kingston et al., PJ,
2015; Nicodemo and Ramos, 2012). Additionally, the country of origin has been shown to
have a crucial impact on immigrants’ labour market outcomes (Moore and Amey, 2002;
Barrett and Duffy, 2008). However, Bloom and Gunderson (1991) and Kogan (2003) have
implied that immigrants’ labour market position significantly improves as the duration of
their stay in the host country increases. Looking at the issue from the perspective of gen-
der, Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2005) point out that female immigrants’ labour-market
position tends to be worse than male immigrants’. However, generally speaking, only few
investigations have been made into the determinants of subjective work perceptions, link-
ing them directly to individuals’ actual position in the labour market. Amit and Bolotin
(2018) have introduced the idea of a mismatch between subjective work perceptions and
objective labour-market position among immigrants in the Israeli context. They find
60
that women and immigrants from disadvantaged ethnic groups were more satisfied in the
labour-market considering their actual position in it.
This paper contributes to the literature on job and income satisfaction and the labour-
market integration of immigrants in three ways. First, it creates a subjective work index
(SWI) to capture job and income satisfaction, as well as an objective work index (OWI) to
represent income and actual labour-market position. Second, it investigates the determi-
nants of objective and subjective work indices among workers in the Italian labour market
from the perspectives of gender and migration. Third, this paper estimates the gap be-
tween SWI and OWI and addresses the determinants of this subjective gap. It concludes
with three key findings. First, it provides evidence that the actual labour-market position
of immigrants is worse than that of the native-born population, especially among females
and immigrants from developing countries (except for the China). Second, female immi-
grants are shown to be more satisfied with their position than either male immigrants or
native-born Italian women. Third, on average, female immigrants’ and immigrants from
developing countries’ assessment of their work situation tends to be further from their
actual position relative to native workers, except for the Albanians, Moroccans, and Chi-
nese. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the specifications
of the Italian case; section 3 describes the data and method used to carry out this study;
section 4 presents the results of the study; and section 5 is the conclusion.
3.3 The Italian case
Italy’s transformation from an emigration country to a major destination for international
immigration has been swift, particularly over the last 30 years (cf. Calavita, 2005). This
phenomenon is due not only to the country’s porous borders and proximity to the southern
shore of the Mediterranean, but also to the demands of the Italian economic system and
its yearly quota system for the admission of foreign nationals for work purposes. In Italy,
immigrants are recognized as a necessary workforce in different areas and professions,
although they are still not acknowledged as an essential element of society. They tend
to work in the agricultural and service sectors rather than in industry. Furthermore,
female employment in services is an essential feature of the Italian immigration structure.
Female immigrants mostly work as cleaners, domestic workers and in the area of elderly
care services (cf. Pugliese, 2011). The largest share of immigrants come from North
Africa, with the remaining migration inflows originating mainly from Eastern Europe.
Africans immigrants have the fewest career prospects compared to Eastern European and
Asian workers, and most of them have seasonal or temporary jobs or switch between
legal and illegal employment (cf. Venturini and Villosio, 2008). Nevertheless, the vast
majority of immigrants entering Italy are not at risk of becoming unemployed. Indeed,
the gap in the unemployment rate between new immigrants and native workers is low
61
or insignificant (cf. Reyneri and Fullin, 2008; Jean et al., 2011). However, according to
Fullin and Reyneri (2011), immigrants are disadvantaged as regards the jobs they hold in
the Italian labour market, especially when taking into account educational attainment.
In other words, immigrants obtain low-skilled jobs fairly easily but have difficulty getting
non-manual jobs. Another characteristic of immigrants in Italy is their ability to replace
local workers (Reyneri, 2004). For example, the rising labour force participation of better-
educated young women appears to be creating demand for foreign workers to take the
hardest, lowest-paid jobs, such as housework, childcare and, above all, eldercare. This
situation, combined with a steadily ageing population in recent decades, has contributed
to an increase in demand for labour in the sector (cf. Domingo et al., 2007; Ambrosini,
2001).
3.4 Method
This paper uses cross-sectional quarterly data from the Italian Labour Force Survey (LFS)
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT) from the first quarter of 2008
to the last quarter of 2018. The Italian LFS provides information on a random sample
of 6,129,706 individuals of working age, of whom 36% are working. The data includes
information on income, occupation classification, job and income satisfaction, as well as
rich demographic and economic variables. Individuals were contacted to participate after
their names were randomly extracted from the population lists containing the names of all
families residing in the municipality. The information collected was used to compile data
on employment and unemployment. Employed individuals were asked about their job and
the characteristics of their professional activity. Table 3.1 presents further information on
usable observations.
Italian Immigrant Male Female Total
Observations (N1) 6, 402, 423 377, 677 3, 176, 034 3, 604, 066 6, 780, 100
In working age (N2) 5, 779, 464 350, 242 2, 878, 690 3, 251, 016 6, 129, 706
Working 35% 61% 46% 27% 36%
Unemployed 6% 7% 10% 4% 6%
Out of labour force 59% 32% 44% 69% 57%
Working sample (N3) 1, 997, 776 215, 225 1, 331, 131 881, 870 2, 213, 001
Table 3.1: Description of the sample
3.5 Variables and analyses
This section introduces three dependent variables: an objective work index, a subjective
work index, and the subjective gap. Subjective and objective work indices were com-
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puted by borrowing from the technique used by Amit and Chachashvili-Bolotin (2018) to
calculate their subjective and actual integration indices in the labour market. The ob-
jective work index (OWI) represents the actual job positions held by interviewees in the
labour market, and it was calculated as a mean of two variables: income and occupation
classification. Income was measured by asking the following question: What was your
net salary last month, for all jobs combined? Answers were organized in 10 categories
ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 was identified as the lowest income and 10 as the highest
income in comparison to others in the sample. Occupation classification was also scaled
from 1 to 10, “1” being the lowest-ranking jobs and “10” the highest-ranking ones based
on the Italian Standard Classification of Occupations 2011 (CP2011). CP2011 is a four-
level hierarchically structured classification that covers all jobs in the world, categorizing
them into 10 major groups. Starting from 2011, Istat has adopted the classification of
professions CP2011, the result of updating the previous version (CP2001) and adapting
to the innovations introduced by the International Standard Classification of Occupations
- Isco08 (see appendix A). The highest category was omitted due to lack of observations.
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Figure 3.2: Objective work index distribution
As shown in figure 3.2, the objective work index has an approximately normal distri-
bution, concentrated around a mean of 5. However, the value of the standard deviation
is 1.78, which points to a noticeable inequality in the sample.
The second dependent variable in our analysis is the subjective work index (SWI),
which provides information on workers’ income and job satisfaction. Accordingly, the
SWI was measured by asking two questions: (a) How satisfied are you with your income?
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(b) How satisfied are you with your current job? Answers ranged from 1 to 10, where “1”
was identified as “not satisfied at all” and “10” as “completely satisfied”. I have omitted
all occurrences of the answer “10” as it is an extreme response, which may cast doubt
on its reliability. Consequently, the subjective work index only ranges from 1 to 9. The
distribution of workers’ SWI index is illustrated in figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Subjective work index distribution
According to these data, workers in Italy seem to be generally satisfied with their
work and income, as shown by the SWI mean of 6.8. The reported standard deviation
is 1.2. Figure 3.4 represents the share of immigrants and native-born Italians in each of
the objective and subjective work indices. As shown in figure 3.4, the objective index
appears to be lower for immigrants than for locals. However, the SWI shows no sign of a
divergence between immigrants and native-born Italians.
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Figure 3.4: Subjective and objective variables by migration status (proportions)
Finally, the third variable is the subjective gap (SG), which measures the disparity
between workers’ feelings about their job and their actual position in the labour market.
It is computed by subtracting the objective work index from the subjective work index
(SWI-OWI=SG). The distribution of the subjective gap is illustrated in figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: The subjective gap distribution
The subjective gap variable ranges from -8 to 8 with a positive mean of 1.39. When
an individual’s subjective gap is positive, it indicates that their SWI is higher than their
OWI. In other words, the mean of their level of satisfaction with work and income is
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higher than the mean of their actual income and occupation classification, and vice versa
for a negative subjective gap.
Table 3.2 presents the means and standard deviations of the OWI, SWI, SG, as well
as their components. As far as the OWI is concerned, significant differences in average
Italians Immigrants t-test Males Females t-test
Income classification Mean 4.87 2.92 1.94∗∗∗ 4.92 4.35 0.57∗∗∗
SD 2.59 2.24 − 2.66 2.54 −
Job classification Mean 5.52 4.17 1.35∗∗∗ 5.14 5.78 0.64∗∗∗
SD 1.95 1.42 − 2.02 1.77 −
Objective parameter Mean 4.58 3.43 1.67∗∗∗ 4.84 5.05 0.20∗∗∗
SD 2.27 1.28 − 1.77 1.79 −
Income satisfaction Mean 6.34 6.41 0.06∗∗∗ 6.19 6.59 0.40∗∗∗
SD 1.71 1.50 − 1.80 1.47 −
Job satisfaction Mean 7.34 7.00 0.34∗∗∗ 7.31 7.32 0.012∗∗∗
SD 1.35 1.35 − 1.38 1.31 −
Subjective parameter Mean 6.83 6.68 0.15∗∗∗ 6.81 6.85 0.041∗∗∗
SD 1.28 1.27 − 1.34 1.17 −
The subjective gap Mean 1.20 3.15 1.95∗∗∗ 1.24 1.56 0.31∗∗∗
SD 1.82 1.63 − 1.76 2.02 −
Education Mean 4.5 3.93 0.55∗∗∗ 4.62 4.29 0.09∗∗∗
(Scale from 1 t o 6) SD 1.18 1.28 − 1.18 1.2 −
Age Mean 45.16 41.21 3.81∗∗∗ 44.77 44.73 0.80∗∗∗
SD 10.79 10.28 − 10.62 10.95 −
Years of immigration Mean − 14.96 − 14.47 15.41 0.11∗∗∗
SD − 6.28 − 5.98 6.52 −
Employer size Mean 3.22 2.19 1.34∗∗∗ 3.22 2.98 0.23∗∗∗
(Scale from 1 t o 6) SD 1.91 1.68 − 1.92 1.90 −
Table 3.2: Means and standard deviations
income and job classification were found between immigrants and locals, which means
that the objective work index varies by migration status. The data seems to indicate
that immigrants’ actual labour market position tends to be worse than locals’. In con-
trast, while gender differences were also detected in the OWI, they were found to be less
pronounced.
Rows 4 to 6 tabulate income and job satisfaction as well as the SWI. The data suggests
that there are no significant differences in average income satisfaction between immigrants
and locals. However, job satisfaction was found to be slightly higher among immigrants
than among native-born Italians. We also see a slight difference in income satisfaction
across gender. Finally, as shown in row 7, there is a significant difference in the subjective
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gap between immigrants and locals. In other words, immigrants seem to be more satisfied
than locals with their actual position in the labour market.
In summary, this section leads me to put forth the following hypothesis: the OWI
shows high heterogeneity in favor of locals. However, no significant differences were de-
tected in the SWI. In other words, despite the fact that immigrants’ actual labour market
position appears to be worse, both immigrants and locals seem to have the same level of
satisfaction. Therefore, it is now necessary to test the existence of a proper relationship
between the dependent variables and the different identity groups, using a formal signifi-
cance test to assess the linearity of this relationship. These tests aim to control for other
characteristics and factors that may affect the objective and subjective work indices. The
hypothesis is tested using an Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS), in three steps as
follows:
Yi = BXi + ei (3.1)
In equation (3.1) , dependent variable Yi represents the respective expected outcome
of the SWI, OWI, and SG separately, while B is the coefficient of each control variable Xi.
The analysis was conducted in four stages. The control variables introduced in the first
stage are key to understanding the labour market integration of immigrants. They all
appear in the literature on migration and can be divided into work- and non-work-related
categories. Non-work-specific determinants include general demographic and migration-
related factors expressed statistically, such as gender, migration status, age, age-squared,
education, marital status, and years since migration. Work-specific determinants include
employer size and the type of working contract. Fixed effect controls, such as region
and year-quarter fixed effects, are used to ensure the robustness of the analysis. For
instance, let us assume that an individual k has a characteristic Xi such that BXi=2.
Then the expected mean of the dependent variable for individual k is twice as high as
for an individual that does not have the characteristic in question. In the second stage, I
introduce a dummy for the interaction between being a woman and an immigrant, to check
whether the gender effect is stronger than the migration effect. In the third stage, I insert
a dummy variable representing the level of development of the country of origin in order to
determine the impact of being an immigrant from a developing country on the dependent
variables. Finally, in the fourth stage, I introduce dummies that included candidates
coming from the nine most common foreign nationalities of immigrants living in Italy
to evaluate the impact of being an immigrant from a specific country on the variables
of interest.The complete analysis is repeated for each dependent variable – the SWI, the
OWI, and the SG. Multivariate regression results are reported in the next section.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Objective work index
The first part of the analysis consists in testing the determinants of the objective work
index. Table 3.3 displays the results of OLS regressions in which the Objective work index
Objective (1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrant -1.05∗∗∗(0.01) -0.90∗∗∗(0.02) -0.57∗∗∗(0.03) -0.61∗∗∗(0.03)
Gender (Female) -0.30∗∗∗(0.00) −0.08∗∗∗(0.00) -0.27∗∗∗(0.01) -0.08∗∗∗(0.01)
Elementary degree -0.59∗∗∗(0.03) −0.49∗∗∗(0.03) -0.58∗∗∗(0.03) -0.45∗∗∗(0.03)
Middle School diploma 0.02(0.03) 0.04(0.03) 0.04(0.03) -0.12∗∗∗(0.03)
Diploma 2-3 years 0.53∗∗∗(0.03) 0.54∗∗∗(0.03) 0.54∗∗∗(0.03) 0.61∗∗∗(0.03)
Diploma 4-5 years 1.30∗∗∗(0.03) 1.32∗∗∗(0.03) 1.32∗∗∗(0.03) 1.25∗∗∗(0.03)
University degree 2.54∗∗∗(0.03) 2.56∗∗∗(0.03) 2.55∗∗∗(0.03) 2.30∗∗∗(0.03)
Full-time job 1.66∗∗∗(0.00) 1.66∗∗∗(0.01) 1.66∗∗∗(0.00) 1.56∗∗∗(0.00)
Age 0.09∗∗∗(0.00) 0.09∗∗∗(0.00) 0.09∗∗∗(0.00) 0.08∗∗∗(0.00)
Age2 -0.68∗∗∗(0.02) -0.68∗∗∗(0.02) -0.68∗∗∗(0.02) -0.68∗∗∗(0.02)
Married 0.27∗∗∗(0.01) 0.27∗∗∗(0.01) 0.27∗∗∗(0.00) 0.21∗∗∗(0.00)
Separated or divorced 0.05∗∗∗(0.01) 0.05∗∗∗(0.01) 0.06∗∗∗(0.00) 0.01∗∗∗(0.00)
Widower -0.12∗∗∗(0.02) -0.10∗∗∗(0.02) -0.1∗∗∗(0.02) -0.01∗∗∗(0.02)
Years since migration/100 -0.55∗∗∗(0.00) -0.82∗∗∗(0.00) -0.76∗∗∗(0.00) -0.56∗∗∗(0.00)
Employer size
Between 10 and 15 0.18∗∗∗(0.01) 0.17∗∗∗(0.01) 0.17∗∗∗(0.01) 0.18∗∗∗(0.00)
Between 16 and 19 0.34∗∗∗(0.01) 0.33∗∗∗(0.01) 0.33∗∗∗(0.01) 0.44∗∗∗(0.00)
Between 20 and 49 0.30∗∗∗(0.01) 0.29∗∗∗(0.01) 0.3∗∗∗(0.01) 0.58∗∗∗(0.01)
Between 50 and 249 0.46∗∗∗(0.01) 0.45∗∗∗(0.01) 0.45∗∗∗(0.01) 0.45∗∗∗(0.01)
250 and more 0.69∗∗∗(0.01) 0.69∗∗∗(0.01) 0.69∗∗∗(0.00) 0.69∗∗∗(0.00)
Female*Immigrant -0.26∗∗∗(0.01) -0.27∗∗∗(0.01) -0.31∗∗∗(0.01)
Table 3.3: Objective work index regressions
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Objective (1) (2) (3) (4)
Developing -0.35∗∗∗(0.02) -0.2∗∗∗(0.03)
Country of origin
Albania 0.22∗∗∗(0.02)
Moldova -0.16∗∗∗(0.03)
Romania -0.05∗∗(0.02)
Morocco 0.08∗∗(0.03)
Ukraine -0.4∗∗∗(0.03)
China 0.88∗∗∗(0.03)
Philippine -0.72∗∗∗(0.03)
Ecuador -0.11∗∗(0.04)
Poland -0.28∗∗∗(0.04)
Region fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Year/quarter fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 423546 423546 423546 446880
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
(Continues) Table 3.3: Objective work index regressions
is the dependent variable. Column 1 shows that being an immigrant lowers the ex-
pected mean of the OWI by 1 degree compared to locals. The expected mean of the
OWI is also 0.3 time lower for women than for men. High education, full-time job, and
marriage dummies all increase the expected OWI, in accordance with what is found in
the literature (cf. Ionescu and Cuza, 2012; Green and Riddell, 2001; Brown and Medoff,
1989). Age has a relatively low impact on the objective work index, whereas age-squared
is negatively associated with it. This only means that age only affects the objective pa-
rameter after a certain age. As shown in column 2, female immigrants have a lower OWI
than Italian women (-0.26). The developing country dummy is associated with an OWI
that is 0.35 lower compared to immigrants from developed countries. Finally, the country
of origin dummies -except Albania, Morocco, and China- all associated with relatively
low OWI comparing to other immigrants and native-born Italians.
3.6.2 Subjective work index
Table 3.4 displays the results of OLS regressions in which the subjective work index is the
dependent variable. Column 1 shows that immigrants seem to be less satisfied than natives
with their position in the labour market, as their SWI is lower by 0.7. Education, marriage,
and a full-time job are found to be positively associated with the subjective work index.
As shown in column 2, female immigrants are slightly more satisfied with their position
in the labour market than Italian women. Altogether, the results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4
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demonstrate that past research has made significant strides towards our understanding of
the factors influencing an individual’s objective and subjective work indices. Our results
are in line with the literature that shows that immigrants suffer more in the labour market
and register lower levels of satisfaction than locals. But this work has added value in that
it provides evidence of the higher satisfaction with the labour market reported by female
immigrants relative to native women. It also shows that immigrants from developing
countries report the same level of satisfaction as locals even after extending the test for
countries of origin.
Subjective (1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrant -0.17∗∗∗(0.02) -0.25∗∗∗(0.02) -0.26∗∗∗(0.03) -0.15∗∗∗(0.03)
Gender (Female) 0.06∗∗∗(0.00) 0.05∗∗∗(0.01) 0.05∗∗∗(0.01) 0.03∗∗∗(0.00)
Elementary degree 0.28∗∗∗(0.04) 0.27∗∗∗(0.03) 0.27∗∗∗(0.03) 0.11∗∗∗(0.03)
Middle School diploma 0.34∗∗∗(0.03) 0.34∗∗∗(0.03) 0.33∗∗∗(0.03) 0.19∗∗∗(0.03)
Diploma 2-3 years 0.41∗∗∗(0.03) 0.41∗∗∗(0.03) 0.406∗∗∗(0.03) 0.27∗∗∗(0.03)
Diploma 4-5 years 0.44∗∗∗(0.03) 0.43∗∗∗(0.03) 0.43∗∗∗(0.03) 0.33∗∗∗(0.03)
University degree 0.44∗∗∗(0.03) 0.43∗∗∗(0.03) 0.43∗∗∗(0.03) 0.35∗∗∗(0.03)
Full-time job 0.36∗∗∗(0.00) 0.36∗∗∗(0.01) 0.36 0.32∗∗∗(0.00)
Age -0.00∗(0.00) -0.00∗(0.00) -0.00385∗(0.00) -0.00∗∗(0.00)
Age2 -0.06∗∗(0.02) -0.06∗∗(0.02) -0.0570∗∗(0.02) -0.04∗∗∗(0.01)
Married 0.16∗∗∗(0.01) 0.16∗∗∗(0.00) 0.16∗∗∗(0.01) 0.17∗∗∗(0.00)
Separated or divorced 0.06∗∗∗(0.01) 0.05∗∗∗(0.00) 0.05∗∗∗(0.01) 0.00∗∗∗(0.00)
Widower 0.19∗∗∗(0.02) 0.19∗∗∗(0.01) 0.19∗∗∗(0.01) 0.12∗∗∗(0.00)
Years since migration/100 0.49∗∗∗(0.00) 0.56∗∗∗(0.00) 0.57∗∗∗(0.00) 0.46∗∗∗(0.00)
Employer size
Between 10 and 15 0.06∗∗∗(0.00) 0.06∗∗∗(0.00) 0.0637∗∗∗(0.01) 0.09∗∗∗(0.00)
Between 16 and 19 0.09∗∗∗(0.00) 0.09∗∗∗(0.00) 0.09∗∗∗(0.01) 0.11∗∗∗(0.01)
Between 20 and 49 0.08∗∗∗(0.01) 0.08∗∗∗(0.01) 0.08∗∗∗(0.01) 0.1∗∗∗(0.01)
Between 50 and 249 0.09∗∗∗(0.01) 0.09∗∗∗(0.00) 0.09∗∗∗(0.01) 0.1∗∗∗(0.01)
Table 3.4: Subjective work index regressions
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Subjective (1) (2) (3) (3)
250 and more 0.09∗∗∗(0.00) 0.09∗∗∗(0.00) 0.09∗∗∗(0.01) 0.09∗∗∗(0.01)
Female*Immigrant 0.13∗∗∗(0.01) 0.130∗∗∗(0.01) 0.04∗∗∗(0.01)
Developing 0.02(0.02) -0.04(0.03)
Country of origin
Albania -0.02(0.02)
Moldova 0.09∗∗∗(0.03)
Romania 0.12∗∗∗(0.02)
Morocco -0.22∗∗∗(0.02)
Ukraine 0.21∗∗∗(0.02)
China 0.07∗(0.03)
Philippine 0.09∗∗∗(0.03)
Ecuador 0.06(0.04)
Poland -0.09∗(0.04)
Region fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Year/quarter fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 449182 449182 449182 448343
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
(Continues) Table 3.4: Subjective work index regressions
3.6.3 The subjective gap
The subjective gap is a variable representing the disparity between a worker’s assessment
of their position in the labour market and their actual job position. If the difference
between the subjective perceptions and objective position is negative, it means the in-
dividual is less satisfied with their position in the labour market than they should be.
Conversely, if the subjective gap is positive, then the individual’s subjective assessment
of their job is higher than it should be. I estimated equation (3.1) with the subjective gap
as a dependent variable. The subjective gap variable ranges from -8 to +8. When the
The subjective gap (1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrant 0.83∗∗∗(0.02) 0.63∗∗∗(0.02) 0.29∗∗∗(0.03) 0.49∗∗∗(0.04)
Gender (Female) 0.36∗∗∗(0.00) 0.32∗∗∗(0.00)5 0.31∗∗∗(0.00) 0.17∗∗∗(0.00)
Elementary degree 0.89∗∗∗(0.04) 0.88∗∗∗(0.0) 0.87∗∗∗(0.04) 0.65∗∗∗(0.04)
Table 3.5: The subjective gap regressions
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The subjective gap (1) (2) (3) (4)
Middle School diploma 0.36∗∗∗(0.04) 0.33∗∗∗(0.04) 0.33∗∗∗(0.04) 0.17∗∗∗(0.04)
Diploma 2-3 years -0.0827(0.0424) -0.10∗(0.04) -0.10∗(0.04) -0.25∗∗∗(0.04)
Diploma 4-5 years -0.82∗∗∗(0.04) -0.85∗∗∗(0.04) -0.85∗∗∗(0.04) -0.84∗∗∗(0.04)
University degree -2.08∗∗∗(0.04) -2.10∗∗∗(0.04) -2.10∗∗∗(0.04) -1.94∗∗∗(0.04)
Full-time job -1.24∗∗∗(0.00) -1.24∗∗∗(0.00) -1.24∗∗∗(0.01) -1.19∗∗∗(0.00)
Age -0.09∗∗∗(0.00) -0.09∗∗∗(0.00) -0.09∗∗∗(0.00) -0.09∗∗∗(0.02)
Age2 0.65∗∗∗(0.02) 0.66∗∗∗(0.02) 0.65∗∗∗(0.02) 0.67∗∗∗(0.02)
Married -0.09∗∗∗(0.01) -0.09∗∗∗(0.00) -0.09∗∗∗(0.01) -0.08∗∗∗(0.00)
Separated or divorced 0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.01) 0.00(0.01) -0.019∗∗∗(0.01)
Widower 0.30∗∗∗(0.02) 0.29∗∗∗(0.02) 0.28∗∗∗(0.02) 0.19∗∗∗(0.02)
Years since migration/100 1.05∗∗∗(0.00) 1.24∗∗∗(0.00) 1.39∗∗∗(0.00) -0.16∗∗∗(0.00)
Employer size
Between 10 and 15 -0.22∗∗∗(0.01) -0.21∗∗∗(0.01) -0.21∗∗∗(0.01) -0.16∗∗∗(0.00)
Between 16 and 19 -0.36∗∗∗(0.01) -0.35∗∗∗(0.01) -0.35∗∗∗(0.01) -0.31∗∗∗(0.00)
Between 20 and 49 -0.34∗∗∗(0.01) -0.33∗∗∗(0.01) -0.33∗∗∗(0.01) -0.27∗∗∗(0.01)
Between 50 and 249 -0.48∗∗∗(0.01) -0.48∗∗∗(0.01) -0.48∗∗∗(0.01) -0.44∗∗∗(0.00)
250 and more -0.72∗∗∗(0.01) -0.71∗∗∗(0.01) -0.71∗∗∗(0.01) -0.62∗∗∗(0.01)
Female*Immigrant 0.37∗∗∗(0.02) 0.39∗∗∗(0.02) 0.29∗∗∗(0.01)
Developing 0.33∗∗∗(0.03) 0.18∗∗∗(0.03)
Country of origin
Albania -0.25∗∗∗(0.03)
Moldova 0.25∗∗∗(0.04)
Romania 0.14∗∗∗(0.02)
Morocco -0.29∗∗∗(0.03)
Ukraine 0.56∗∗∗(0.03)
China -0.77∗∗∗(0.05)
Philippine 0.78∗∗∗(0.04)
Ecuador 0.16∗∗∗(0.05)
(Continues) Table 3.5: The subjective gap regressions
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The subjective gap (1) (2) (3) (4)
Poland 0.16∗∗∗(0.06)
Region fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Year/quarter fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 407186 407186 407186 368674
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
(Continues) Table 3.5: The subjective gap regressions
coefficient is positive, it means that the control variable is associated with a positive
difference between the SWI and OWI, whereas a negative coefficient indicates that the
tested control variable is responsible for a SWI that is lower than the OWI. The coefficients
in column 1 of table 3.5 suggest that the SG is higher for immigrants than for native-born
Italians (0.83) and for women than for men (0.36). In other words, the gap between
the SWI and OWI is wider for immigrants and for women than for locals and for males
respectively. High education, a full-time job, and employer size are all associated with
a reduction in the subjective gap. Age-squared widens the expected gap, which means
that the SG is positively correlated with age only after a certain age. As shown in
column 2 of table 3.5, the SG is wider for female immigrants than for native-born women.
The developing country dummy in column 3 suggests that the mean of the subjective
gap is higher (0.33) for immigrants from developing countries than for immigrants from
developed countries or for locals. Finally, dummies of the country of origin confirm
that immigrants from the most common foreign nationalities in Italy also have a higher
subjective gap than other immigrants or locals except for Albania, Marrocco, and china
that are all associated with negative subjective gap.
3.6.4 Robustness checks
In this section, I run several checks to ensure the robustness of the analysis. The first
robustness check illustrated in tables 3.6 and 3.7 replicates the subjective gap analysis
for 2014 and 2018 respectively. The results remain unchanged, which means that there is
no variation depending on the period selected. Second, I run the subjective gap regres-
sions using an ordered probability model, as it is incorrect to treat ordinal satisfaction
data as though they were cardinal (cf. Bryman & Carmer, 1990). Table 3.8 confirms the
robustness of the analysis as the results remain the same despite the use of a different
method. Third, I borrow the mismatch technique from Amit and Chachashvili-Bolotin
(2018) to compute the subjective gap in a different way. The new subjective mismatch
variable is dichotomous: “1” indicates a positive subjective mismatch while “0” repre-
sents a negative subjective mismatch. A positive subjective mismatch is defined as the
respondent’s SWI being at least half a standard deviation above their OWI. In contrast,
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a negative subjective mismatch is defined as the respondent’s SWI being at least half
a standard deviation below their OWI. I run a probability model using the subjective
mismatch variable in order to measure the probability of being positively matched (1) vs
being negatively matched (0). Table 3.9 displays the mismatch regression results, which
are in line with the results of the subjective gap regressions. Finally, I run the same
analyses using the gap between income satisfaction and actual income( table 3.10), and
between work satisfaction and job satisfaction( table 3.11). The results, however, remain
identical to the findings of the subjective gap analysis.
The subjective gap 2014 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrant 0.87∗∗∗(0.05) 0.56∗∗∗(0.05) 0.19∗(0.08) 0.32∗∗∗(0.09)
Gender (Female) 0.71∗∗∗(0.01) 0.66∗∗∗(0.01) 0.65∗∗∗(0.01) 0.49∗∗∗(0.00)
Age -0.09∗∗∗(0.00) -0.09∗∗∗(0.00) -0.09∗∗∗(0.00) -0.08∗∗∗(0.00)
Age2 0.56∗∗∗(0.05) 0.57∗∗∗(0.05) 0.57∗∗∗(0.05) 0.56∗∗∗(0.04)
Elementary degree 0.91∗∗∗(0.09) 0.90∗∗∗(0.09) 0.89∗∗∗(0.09) 0.62∗∗∗(0.09)
Middle School diploma 0.37∗∗∗(0.08) 0.34∗∗∗(0.08) 0.34∗∗∗(0.08) 0.14(0.08)
Diploma 2-3 years -0.09(0.09) -0.12(0.09) -0.121(0.0888) -0.27∗∗∗(0.09)
Diploma 4-5 years -0.89∗∗∗(0.08) -0.92∗∗∗(0.08) -0.91∗∗∗(0.08) -0.95∗∗∗(0.08)
University degree -2.21∗∗∗(0.08) -2.24∗∗∗(0.08) -2.23∗∗∗(0.08) -2.09∗∗∗(0.08)
Married -0.09∗∗∗(0.01) -0.08∗∗∗(0.01) -0.08∗∗∗(0.01) -0.06∗∗∗(0.02)
Separated or divorced -0.05∗(0.02) -0.06∗(0.02) -0.05∗(0.02) -0.06∗(0.03)
Widower 0.28∗∗∗(0.05) 0.26∗∗∗(0.05) 0.25∗∗∗(0.05) 0.17∗∗(0.05)
Employer size
Between 10 and 15 -0.37∗∗∗(0.02) -0.36∗∗∗(0.02) -0.35∗∗∗(0.02) -0.28∗∗∗(0.02)
Between 16 and 19 -0.53∗∗∗(0.01) -0.52∗∗∗(0.01) -0.52∗∗∗(0.01) -0.47∗∗∗(0.02)
Between 20 and 49 -0.49∗∗∗(0.03) -0.48∗∗∗(0.03) -0.47∗∗∗(0.03) -0.44∗∗∗(0.01)
Between 50 and 249 -0.66∗∗∗(0.02) -0.65∗∗∗(0.01) -0.65∗∗∗(0.02) -0.61∗∗∗(0.02)
250 and more -0.92∗∗∗(0.02) -0.91∗∗∗(0.02) -0.91∗∗∗(0.02) -0.84∗∗∗(0.00)
Years since migration/100 1.22∗∗∗(0.00) 1.58∗∗∗(0.00) 1.75∗∗∗(0.00) 0.01∗∗(0.01)
Table 3.6: Robustness check-The subjective gap regressions (2014)
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The subjective gap 2014 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female*Immigrant 0.51∗∗∗(0.03) 0.52∗∗∗(0.04) 0.41∗∗∗(0.04)
Developing 0.37∗∗∗(0.06) 0.17∗(0.08)
Country of origin
Albania -0.36∗∗∗(0.07)
Moldova 0.38∗∗∗(0.09)
Romania 0.07(0.05)
Morocco -0.43∗∗∗(0.07)
Ukraine 0.56∗∗∗(0.08)
China -0.97∗∗∗(0.13)
Philippine 1.16∗∗∗(0.08)
Ecuador 0.24∗(0.11)
Poland 0.00
Region fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Quarter fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 92258 92258 92258 87236
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
(Continues) Table 3.6: Robustness check-The subjective gap regressions (2014)
The subjective gap 2018 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrant 0.67∗∗∗(0.06) 0.47∗∗∗(0.07) 0.38∗∗∗(0.08) 0.45∗∗∗(0.08)
Gender (Female) 0.67∗∗∗(0.01) 0.63∗∗∗(0.01) 0.50∗∗∗(0.01) 0.51∗∗∗(0.01)
Age -0.09∗∗∗(0.00) -0.09∗∗∗(0.00) -0.08∗∗∗(0.00) -0.07∗∗∗(0.00)
Age2 0.62∗∗∗(0.06) 0.62∗∗∗(0.06) 0.50∗∗∗(0.05) 0.49∗∗∗(0.05)
Elementary degree 0.93∗∗∗(0.13) 0.93∗∗∗(0.13) 0.66∗∗∗(0.09) 0.61∗∗∗(0.09)
Middle School diploma 0.26∗(0.12) 0.25∗(0.12) 0.16(0.08) 0.08∗∗∗(0.08)
Diploma 2-3 years -0.24∗∗∗(0.09) -0.24∗(0.12) -0.25∗(0.12) -0.35∗∗∗(0.08)
Diploma 4-5 years -0.95∗∗∗(0.12) -0.97∗∗∗(0.12) -0.97∗∗∗(0.12) -0.94∗∗∗(0.08)
University degree -2.26∗∗∗(0.12) -2.28∗∗∗(0.12) -2.27∗∗∗(0.12) -2.14∗∗∗(0.08)
Married -0.05∗∗(0.02) -0.05∗(0.02) -0.05∗(0.02) -0.06∗∗∗(0.02)
Table 3.7: Robustness check-The subjective gap regressions (2018)
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The subjective gap 2018 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Separated or divorced -0.02(0.03) 0.05(0.03) 0.0566(0.0326) -0.03∗∗∗(0.02)
Widower 0.27∗∗∗(0.07) 0.39∗∗∗(0.07) 0.39∗∗∗(0.07) 0.2∗∗∗(0.05)
Employer size
Between 10 and 15 -0.28∗∗∗(0.03) -0.30∗∗∗(0.03) -0.30∗∗∗(0.03) -0.26∗∗(0.02)
Between 16 and 19 -0.50∗∗∗(0.02) -0.49∗∗∗(0.02) -0.49∗∗∗(0.02) -0.45∗∗∗(0.02)
Between 20 and 49 -0.51∗∗∗(0.04) -0.49∗∗∗(0.04) -0.50∗∗∗(0.04) -0.39∗∗∗(0.03)
Between 50 and 249 -0.66∗∗∗(0.02) -0.65∗∗∗(0.02) -0.61∗∗∗(0.02) -0.6∗∗∗(0.02)
250 and more -0.93∗∗∗(0.02) -0.93∗∗∗(0.02) - -0.81∗∗∗(0.02) -0.8∗∗∗(0.02)
Years since migration/100 1.6∗∗∗(0.00) 2.02∗∗∗(0.00) 0.01∗∗(0.00) 0.02∗∗(0.00)
Female*Immigrant 0.36∗∗∗(0.05) 0.31∗∗∗(0.04) 0.23∗∗∗(0.04)
Developing 0.21∗(0.06) 0.17∗(0.07)
Country of origin
Albania -0.28∗∗∗(0.07)
Moldova -0.02(0.09)
Romania -0.02(0.05)
Morocco -0.38∗∗∗(0.08)
Ukraine 0.57∗∗∗(0.08)
China -0.67∗∗∗(0.1)
Philippine 0.84∗∗∗(0.09)
Ecuador 0.27∗(0.12)
Poland -0.11∗∗∗(0.14)
Region fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Quarter fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 73888 73888 73888 73888
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
(Continues) Table 3.7: Robustness check-The subjective gap regressions (2018)
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The subjective gap (1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrant 0.45∗∗∗(0.01) 0.32∗∗∗(0.01) 0.15∗∗∗(0.02) 0.28∗∗∗(0.02)
Gender (Female) 0.37∗∗∗(0.00) 0.34∗∗∗(0.00) 0.34∗∗∗(0.00) 0.29∗∗∗(0.04)
Age -0.05∗∗∗(0.00) -0.05∗∗∗(0.00) -0.05∗∗∗(0.00) -0.05∗∗∗(0.02)
Age2 0.34∗∗∗(0.01) 0.34∗∗∗(0.01) 0.34∗∗∗(0.01) 0.39∗∗∗(0.02)
Elementary degree 0.50∗∗∗(0.02) 0.49∗∗∗(0.02) 0.49∗∗∗(0.02) 0.42∗∗∗(0.02)
Middle School diploma 0.17∗∗∗(0.02) 0.16∗∗∗(0.02) 0.16∗∗∗(0.02) 0.08∗∗∗(0.02)
Diploma 2-3 years -0.07∗∗(0.02) -0.08∗∗∗(0.02) -0.08∗∗∗(0.02) -0.16∗∗∗(0.02)
Diploma 4-5 years -0.48∗∗∗(0.02) -0.50∗∗∗(0.02) -0.50∗∗∗(0.02) -0.54∗∗∗(0.02)
University degree -1.18∗∗∗(0.02) -1.20∗∗∗(0.02) -1.20∗∗∗(0.02) -1.21∗∗∗(0.02)
Married -0.03∗∗∗(0.00) -0.02∗∗∗(0.00) -0.02∗∗∗(0.00) -0.02∗∗∗(0.02)
Separated or divorced 0.01(0.00) 0.01(0.00) 0.00(0.00) 0.00
Widower 0.17∗∗∗(0.01) 0.16∗∗∗(0.01) 0.16∗∗∗(0.01) 0.12∗∗∗(0.02)
Employer size
Between 10 and 15 -0.18∗∗∗(0.00) -0.17∗∗∗(0.00) -0.17∗∗∗(0.00) -0.16∗∗∗(0.00)
Between 16 and 19 -0.28∗∗∗(0.00) -0.27∗∗∗(0.00) -0.27∗∗∗(0.00) -0.28∗∗∗(0.00)
Between 20 and 49 -0.26∗∗∗(0.00) -0.25∗∗∗(0.00) -0.25∗∗∗(0.00) -0.25∗∗∗(0.00)
Between 50 and 249 -0.36∗∗∗(0.00) -0.36∗∗∗(0.00) -0.36∗∗∗(0.00) -0.37∗∗∗(0.00)
250 and more -0.50∗∗∗(0.00) -0.49∗∗∗(0.00) -0.49∗∗∗(0.00) -0.5∗∗∗(0.00)
Years since migration/100 0.68∗∗∗(0.00) 0.69∗∗∗(0.00) 0.67∗∗∗(0.00) 0.67∗∗∗(0.00)
Female*Immigrant 0.24∗∗∗(0.01) 0.24∗∗∗(0.01) 0.22∗∗∗(0.00)
Developing 0.17∗∗∗(0.01) 0.092∗∗∗(0.00)
Country of origin
Albania -0.18∗∗∗(0.02)
Moldova 0.13∗∗∗(0.02)
Romania 0.03∗∗∗(0.02)
Morocco -0.18∗∗∗(0.02)
Table 3.8: Robustness check-The subjective gap ordered probability regressions
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The subjective gap (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ukraine 0.31∗∗∗(0.02)
China -0.44∗∗∗(0.03)
Philippine 0.57∗∗∗(0.02)
Ecuador 0.18∗∗∗(0.02)
Poland 0.05∗∗∗(0.02)
Region fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Year/quarter fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 407186 407186 407186 368674
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
(Continues) Table 3.8: Robustness check-The subjective gap ordered probability regressions
The subjective mismatch (1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrant 1.23∗∗∗(0.03) 1.13∗∗∗(0.03) 0.71∗∗∗(0.04) 0.58∗∗∗(0.0
Gender (Female) 0.53∗∗∗(0.00) 0.52∗∗∗(0.00) 0.52∗∗∗(0.00) 0.71∗∗∗(0.0
Age -0.05∗∗∗(0.00) -0.05∗∗∗(0.00) -0.05∗∗∗(0.00) -0.08∗∗∗(0.0
Age2 0.18∗∗∗(0.02) 0.18∗∗∗(0.024) 0.17∗∗∗(0.02) 0.49∗∗∗(0.0
Elementary degree 0.23∗∗∗(0.05) 0.22∗∗∗(0.05) 0.23∗∗∗(0.05) 0.16∗∗∗(0.0
Middle School diploma -0.09(0.05) -0.10∗(0.05) -0.10∗(0.05) -0.21∗∗∗(0.0
Diploma 2-3 years -0.20∗∗∗(0.05) -0.21∗∗∗(0.05) -0.20∗∗∗(0.05) -0.39∗∗∗(0.0
Diploma 4-5 years -0.59∗∗∗(0.05) -0.61∗∗∗(0.05) -0.60∗∗∗(0.05) -0.9∗∗∗(0.0
University degree -1.50∗∗∗(0.05) -1.52∗∗∗(0.05) -1.51∗∗∗(0.05) -1.9∗∗∗(0.0)
Married -0.19∗∗∗(0.01) -0.18∗∗∗(0.00) -0.18∗∗∗(0.01) -0.26∗∗∗(0.0
Separated or divorced -0.09∗∗∗(0.01) -0.09∗∗∗(0.01) -0.09∗∗∗(0.01) -0.16∗∗∗(0.0
Widower 0.06∗(0.02) 0.05∗(0.02) 0.04(0.02) -0.04(0.0
Employer size
Between 10 and 15 0.65∗∗∗(0.01) 0.66∗∗∗(0.01) 0.65∗∗∗(0.01) 0.55∗∗∗(0.0)
Between 16 and 19 0.85∗∗∗(0.01) 0.85∗∗∗(0.01) 0.85∗∗∗(0.01) 0.58∗∗∗(0.0)
Between 20 and 49 0.77∗∗∗(0.01) 0.77∗∗∗(0.01) 0.77∗∗∗(0.01) 0.58∗∗∗(0.0)
Table 3.9: Robustness check-The subjective mismatch probability regressions
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The subjective mismatch (1) (2) (3) (4)
Between 50 and 249 0.79∗∗∗(0.00) 0.79∗∗∗(0.00) 0.79∗∗∗(0.00) 0.45∗∗∗(0.0
250 and more 0.60∗∗∗(0.01) 0.60∗∗∗(0.01) 0.60∗∗∗(0.01) 0.19∗∗∗(0.0)
Years since migration/100 -1.15∗∗∗(0.00) -1.04∗∗∗(0.00) -0.81∗∗∗(0.00) -0.66∗∗∗(0.0
Female*Immigrant 0.17∗∗∗(0.02) 0.19∗∗∗(0.02) 0.02∗∗∗(0.0)
Developing 0.44∗∗∗(0.03) 0.7∗∗∗(0.0
Country of origin
Albania -0.14∗∗∗(0.04)
Moldova 0.46∗∗∗(0.06)
Romania 0.07∗(0.03)
Morocco -0.02∗∗∗(0.05)
Ukraine 1.07∗∗∗(0.07)
China -2.04∗∗∗(0.04)
Philippine 1.09∗∗∗(0.08)
Ecuador 0.39∗∗∗(0.08)
Poland 0.88∗∗∗(0.08)
Region fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Year/quarter fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 275784 275784 275784 290861
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
(Continues) Table 3.9: Robustness check-The subjective mismatch probability regressions
Income satisfaction gap (1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrant 1.13∗∗∗(0.02) 1.01∗∗∗(0.03) 0.71∗∗∗(0.04) 0.77∗∗∗(0.04)
Gender (Female) 1.11∗∗∗(0.00) 1.09∗∗∗(0.00) 1.09∗∗∗(0.00) 0.90∗∗∗(0.07)
Elementary degree 0.55∗∗∗(0.05) 0.54∗∗∗(0.05) 0.54∗∗∗(0.05) 0.39∗∗∗(0.04)
Middle School diploma 0.06(0.05) 0.04(0.05) 0.0460(0.0532) -0.06(0.04)
Diploma 2-3 years -0.29∗∗∗(0.05) -0.30∗∗∗(0.05) -0.30∗∗∗(0.05) -0.41∗∗∗(0.04)
Diploma 4-5 years -0.77∗∗∗(0.05) -0.78∗∗∗(0.05) -0.78∗∗∗(0.05) -0.75∗∗∗(0.04)
University degree -1.86∗∗∗(0.05) -1.87∗∗∗(0.05) -1.87∗∗∗(0.05) -1.64∗∗∗(0.04)
Table 3.10: Robustness check-Income satisfaction gap regressions
79
Income satisfaction gap (1) (2) (3) (4)
Full-time job -2.4∗∗∗(0.00) -2.41∗∗∗(0.00) -2.41∗∗∗(0.00) -2.36∗∗∗(0.04)
Age -0.19∗∗∗(0.00) -0.19∗∗∗(0.00) -0.19∗∗∗(0.00) -0.17∗∗∗(0.00)
Age2 1.58∗∗∗(0.02) 1.58∗∗∗(0.02) 1.58∗∗∗(0.02) 1.52∗∗∗(0.00)
Married -0.34∗∗∗(0.00) -0.34∗∗∗(0.00) -0.34∗∗∗(0.00) -0.31∗∗∗(0.02)
Separated or divorced -0.20∗∗∗(0.01) -0.21∗∗∗(0.01) -0.21∗∗∗(0.01) -0.18∗∗∗(0.00)
Widower 0.12∗∗∗(0.03) 0.11∗∗∗(0.03) 0.11∗∗∗(0.03) 0.10∗∗∗(0.01)
Years since migration/100 -0.37∗(0.00) -0.25(0.00) -0.12(0.00) -0.17(0.00)
Employer size
Between 10 and 15 -0.28∗∗∗(0.01) -0.27∗∗∗(0.01) -0.28∗∗∗(0.01) -0.27∗∗∗(0.01)
Between 16 and 19 -0.57∗∗∗(0.01) -0.56∗∗∗(0.01) -0.56∗∗∗(0.01) -0.56∗∗∗(0.01)
Between 20 and 49 -0.44∗∗∗(0.01) -0.43∗∗∗(0.02) -0.43∗∗∗(0.01) -0.41∗∗∗(0.01)
Between 50 and 249 -0.83∗∗∗(0.01) -0.82∗∗∗(0.01) -0.82∗∗∗(0.01) -0.82∗∗∗(0.00)
250 and more -1.25∗∗∗(0.01) -1.25∗∗∗(0.01) -1.25∗∗∗(0.01) -1.17∗∗∗(0.01)
Female*Immigrant 0.22∗∗∗(0.02) 0.23∗∗∗(0.02) 0.15∗∗∗(0.02)
Developing 0.30∗∗∗(0.03) 0.07∗∗∗(0.04)
Country of origin
Albania -0.3∗∗∗(0.03)
Moldova 0.22∗∗∗(0.04)
Romania 0.12∗∗∗(0.04)
Morocco -0.25∗∗∗(0.02)
Ukraine 0.78∗∗∗(0.04)
China -0.39∗∗∗(0.04)
Philippine 0.71∗∗∗(0.06)
Ecuador -0.01(0.06)
Poland 0.06(0.07)
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 409900 409900 409900 405282
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
(Continues) Table 3.10: Robustness check-Income satisfaction gap regressions
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Job satisfaction gap (1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigrant 0.67∗∗∗(0.02) 0.39∗∗∗(0.03) 0.02(0.04) 0.04(0.04)
Gender (Female) -0.32∗∗∗(0.00) -0.37∗∗∗(0.01) -0.37∗∗∗(0.00) -0.39∗∗∗(0.00)
Elementary degree 1.10∗∗∗(0.05) 1.09∗∗∗(0.05) 1.08∗∗∗(0.05) 0.90∗∗∗(0.04)
Middle School diploma 0.54∗∗∗(0.04) 0.51∗∗∗(0.05) 0.51∗∗∗(0.05) 0.32∗∗∗(0.04)
Diploma 2-3 years 0.11∗(0.05) 0.08(0.05) 0.08(0.05) -0.1∗(0.04)
Diploma 4-5 years -0.89∗∗∗(0.04) -0.92∗∗∗(0.04) -0.92∗∗∗(0.05) -1.06∗∗∗(0.04)
University degree -2.29∗∗∗(0.05) -2.32∗∗∗(0.05) -2.31∗∗∗(0.05) -2.44∗∗∗(0.04)
Full-time job -0.03∗∗∗(0.00) -0.03∗∗∗(0.01) -0.03∗∗∗(0.01) -0.09∗∗∗(0.00)
Age -0.00∗(0.00) -0.00∗∗(0.00) -0.00∗∗(0.00) 0.00
Age2 -0.27∗∗∗(0.02) -0.26∗∗∗(0.02) -0.27∗∗∗(0.02) -0.28∗∗∗(0.02)
Married 0.14∗∗∗(0.00) 0.15∗∗∗(0.00) 0.15∗∗∗(0.00) 0.09∗∗∗(0.00)
Separated or divorced 0.18∗∗∗(0.01) 0.17∗∗∗(0.01) 0.17∗∗∗(0.01) 0.07∗∗∗(0.01)
Widower 0.46∗∗∗(0.02) 0.44∗∗∗(0.02) 0.43∗∗∗(0.02) 0.27∗∗∗(0.02)
Years since migration 2.06∗∗∗(0.00) 2.32∗∗∗(0.00) 2.50∗∗∗(0.00) 02.36∗∗∗(0.00)
Employer size
Between 10 and 15 -0.07∗∗∗(0.01) -0.05∗∗∗(0.01) -0.05∗∗∗(0.01) 0.00∗∗∗(0.01)
Between 16 and 19 -0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.01) -0.00654(0.01) 0.03∗∗∗(0.00)
Between 20 and 49 -0.11∗∗∗(0.01) -0.09∗∗∗(0.01) -0.09∗∗∗(0.01) -0.04∗∗∗(0.01)
Between 50 and 249 0.02∗(0.00) 0.03∗∗∗(0.00) 0.03∗∗∗(0.00) 0.06∗∗∗(0.00)
250 and more -0.02(0.01) -0.01(0.01) -0.01(0.01) 0.01(0.00)
Female*Immigrant 0.50∗∗∗(0.02) 0.51∗∗∗(0.02) 0.31∗∗∗(0.01)
Developing 0.37∗∗∗(0.03) 0.43∗∗∗(0.03)
Table 3.11: Robustness check-Job satisfaction gap regressions
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Job satisfaction gap (1) (2) (3) (4)
Country of origin
Albania -0.17∗∗∗(0.03)
Moldova 0.35∗∗∗(0.04)
Romania 0.22∗∗∗(0.02)
Morocco -0.37∗∗∗(0.03)
Ukraine 0.49∗∗∗(0.03)
China -1.53∗∗∗(0.04)
Philippine 0.94∗∗∗(0.04)
Ecuador 0.37∗∗∗(0.05)
Poland 0.42∗∗∗(0.06)
Fxed effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 459371 459371 459371 459371
Standard errors in parentheses ∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
(Continues) Table 3.11: Robustness check-Job satisfaction gap regressions
3.7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have used the cross-sectional Italian Labour Force Survey (LFS) to ex-
plore the determinants of workers’ objective and subjective work indices as well as the
gap between them in the Italian labour market. The objective work index (OWI) was cal-
culated as the average of workers’ income and job classification, while the subjective work
index (SWI) was measured as the mean of their self-reported job and income satisfaction.
Based on this, I calculated the subjective gap (SG), which is the difference between the
subjective and objective work indices. A positive subjective gap was defined as a positive
difference between the SWI and OWI, indicating that the individual’s level of work and
income satisfaction is higher than their actual income and occupation classification. Con-
versely, a negative subjective gap meant that an individual’s OWI was higher than their
SWI. Although previous studies have investigated the determinants of objective and sub-
jective work indices separately, they have never done so jointly. There is one exception,
a study conducted using the Israeli CBS Social Survey to compare the subjective percep-
tions and actual position of workers in the labour market, from the perspectives of gender,
migration and the different ethnic groups in Israel (cf. Amit and Chachashvili-Bolotin,
2018). However, the present paper is distinctive in that it computes the subjective gap by
subtracting the objective work index from the subjective work index and focuses on female
immigrants and immigrants from developing countries in the Italian labour market.
I used an Ordinary Least Squares method that allowed me to assess the respective
influence of various endogenous characteristics on the OWI, SWI and SG. Overall, I
found a significant difference in the objective work index between immigrants and native-
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born Italians. In particular, female immigrants and immigrants from developing countries
(except for China) seem to suffer the most in the Italian labour market as compared to
locals. However, no significant differences were found in the subjective work index between
immigrants from developing countries and native-born Italians. Female immigrants are
an exception, they seemed to be slightly more satisfied with their income and profession
relative to other immigrants and locals. Furthermore, I found that immigrants have a
positive subjective gap which is higher than native-born Italians’ subjective gap. This
may be explained by the fact that immigrants tend to have lower expectations than native
Italians, and may, therefore, declare the same level of satisfaction as them despite holding
lower positions in the labour market. The subjective gap is particularly wide among
female immigrants and immigrants from developing countries.
The country of origin dummies lists immigrants from Albania, Morocco, and China
as an exception of the subjective gap results. Job and income satisfaction are not only a
function of wealth or expectations. Subjective considerations can enter the utility func-
tion in important ways. For instance, perceived discrimination affects job satisfaction
(Ensher et al., 2001). Ethnic hierarchy is an indicator of a relevant amount of taste-based
discrimination (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016). The literature on immigrants discrimina-
tion in the Italian labour market has provided evidence that the nationalities mentioned
above are the most suffering from discrimination in the Italian labour market. First-
and second-generation Moroccans and Chinese are the most discriminated (Busetta et
al., 2018). Furthermore, Moroccan and Albanian candidates, as they come from Muslim
countries, could be even more discriminated for religious reasons connected to Islamopho-
bia. Moroccans and Albanians are largely hostile following the 9/11 terrorist attack and
subsequent events. People‘ of Islamic faith’ had the most negative image as a result of
news stories about robberies, assaults and frauds (King and Mai 2002). As a consequence,
the relative low subjective gap among Albanian, Moroccans and Chinese compare to other
immigrants and locals may be a result of personal considerations related to the perceived
discrimination in the workplace.
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Appendix A
The Italian official classification of
occupations
CP2011 is the Italian Official Classification of Occupations created by ISTAT. 2011
indicates the year in which the current version was adopted. Occupations classifications
are a fundamental tool in the collection of statistical data on the labour market.
A.1 The structuring of CP2011:
Following the Recommendation of the European Commission of 29 October 2009 on the
use of the international standard classification of occupations (ISCO-08) (2009/824 /
CE)1, CP2011 has been structured in a similar way to ISCO International Standard Clas-
sification of Occupations version 08. ISCO is the classification of professions created and
managed by the ILO and is the one most used internationally.CP2011 contains nine major
occupation groups as follows:
A.1.1 Legislators, entrepreneurs and top management: The first major group in-
cludes management professions that are responsible for defining the policies and political,
social and economic structures of the communities, organizations or businesses in which
they operate. The level of knowledge required by the professions of this grouping is not
always identifiable in a particular degree of formal education. The tasks of this group are
to define and formulate government policies, laws and norms at a central and local level.
A.1.2 Intellectual, scientific and highly specialized professions: The occupations
included in this group require a high level of theoretical knowledge to analyze and rep-
resent, in specific disciplinary areas, complex situations and problems, define possible
solutions and take the related decisions. This level of knowledge is acquired through the
completion of II level or post-university university education courses or learning paths,
1The international standard classification of occupations (ISCO) is an ILO classification structure for
organizing information on labour and jobs. It is part of the international family of economic and social
classifications of the United Nations. The current version, known as ISCO-08, was published in 2008 and
is the fourth iteration, following ISCO-58, ISCO-68 and ISCO-88 (cf. International Labour Office, 2012).
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even non-formal, of equal complexity.
A.1.3 Technical professions: The third major group includes professions that require
technical knowledge to select and operationally apply protocols and procedures in produc-
tion or service activities. The level of knowledge required by the professions included in
this group is acquired through the completion of secondary, post-secondary or university
level I courses, or learning paths, even non-formal, of equal complexity.
A.1.4 Executive professions in office work: This group includes the professions
that are dedicated to executive office work, carrying out tasks related to the reception,
processing, production and storage of information. The tasks envisaged do not require
management and personnel coordination functions. The common denominator of these
professions is, therefore, the processing of information. These activities generally require
basic knowledge similar to that acquired by completing the compulsory schooling or a
short cycle of upper secondary education or, again, a professional qualification or work
experience.
A.1.5 Qualified professions in commercial activities and services: The fifth ma-
jor group classifies the commercial occupations, reception, and services, recreational and
family support services, personal care, maintenance of public order, and protection of
people and property. These activities generally require basic knowledge comparable to
those acquired by completing the compulsory schooling or short cycle of upper secondary
education or, professional qualification or through work experience.
A.1.6 Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers: The sixth major group
includes manual professions that require experience and technical knowledge of materi-
als, tools and processes to extract or work minerals; to build, repair or maintain arte-
facts, objects and machines; for agricultural, hunting and fishing production; to work and
transform food and agricultural products destined for final consumption. These activities
generally require basic knowledge similar to that acquired by completing the compulsory
schooling or a short cycle of upper secondary education or, professional qualification or
through work experience.
A.1.7 Plant and machine operators, and assemblers: The seventh major group in-
cludes the professions that control the functioning of industrial machines and automated
or robotic processing plants; feed assembly and series production plants; they drive ve-
hicles, mobile or lifting machinery. These activities generally require basic knowledge
similar to that acquired by completing the compulsory schooling or a professional quali-
fication or through work experience.
A.1.8 Elementary occupations: The eighth major group includes professions that
require simple and repetitive activities, for which it is not necessary to complete a par-
ticular educational path and which may involve the use of hand tools, the use of physical
strength and a limited autonomy of judgment and initiative in carrying out the tasks.
These professions carry out itinerant activities and unskilled manual work in agriculture,
construction and industrial production; manual labour and executive support in-office ac-
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tivities, production services, education and health services; concierge and room cleaning
tasks.
A.1.9 Armed forces occupation: The ninth major group includes the professions car-
ried out within the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force and police) which guarantee
the territorial and political integrity of the nation and its security in times of peace and
war. The peculiarity of this grouping, which is not enclosed professions united by similar
work activities but by membership in the same social context of work, makes it stranger
is for the hierarchical classification.
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Appendix B
Variables and definitions
Immigrant dummy respondent does not have the Italian nationality
Developing country dummy respondent is an immigrant and comes from developing country
Female dummy respondent is female
Elementary degree respondent has achieved elementary education at most
Middle School diploma respondent at least has a middle school diploma
Diploma 2-3 years respondent at least has a diploma in 2-3 years
Diploma 4-5 years respondent at least has a diploma in 4-5 years
University degree respondent at least has a university degree
Full-time job Respondent has a full-time job
Age age of respondent at the date of the interview
Married respondent is Married
Separated or divorced respondent is separated or divorced
Widower respondent is a widower
Years since migration number of years since the respondent came to Italy for the first time
Between 10 and 15 respondent works in a place where there are 10 to 15 workers
Between 16 and 19 respondent works in a place where there are 16 to 19 workers
Between 20 and 49 respondent works in a place where there are 20 to 49 workers
Between 50 and 249 respondent works in a place where there are 50 to 249 workers
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250 and more respondent works in a place where there are more than 250 workers
Female*Immigrant respondent is a female immigrant
Albania dummy respondent comes from Albania
Romania dummy respondent comes from Romania
Morocco dummy respondent comes from Morocco
Ukraine dummy respondent comes from Ukraine
China dummy respondent comes from China
Philippine dummy respondent comes from Philippine
Ecuador dummy respondent comes from Ecuador
Poland dummy respondent comes from Poland
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